IDEATION : Governance Councils & Treasury Modules
UPDATE 23/08/23 : almost a year after pausing research on the idea, it seems like it was nearly spot on. It is time to reactivate that debate. Today we have stride in the ICS and it brought some significant similarities to our model. The first of them is the liquid staking of course but most importantly, it brought validators with no consensus risks… Basically this is almost equivalent to what we highlighted in the following document. It creates a potential for a political class to receive token delegations and take a fee without risking any slashing. It’s exactly similar to our prediction of separation of security and voting. We think the market will mature over time and stride may take a significant share of the cosmos politics in the future. This is also where our prediction for councils will likely emerge. This is an interesting time to be in Cosmos ! UPDATE 21/12/22 : After a few weeks in that forum, we have been disgusted but the low level quality of the discussion. Despite a few people who tried their best to debate on the subject, most of the participation is trashing non-sense. Anyway we wanted to let you know that our first experience with cosmos forum is disappointing…
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I have rarely been able to read something so unclear. Obviously the understanding of liquid staking is not good by the authors. A crazy solution for a non-existent problem. Thanks for nothing. Could you elaborate on the problem you think you see and thus solve?
How much would the allocator cost/month? and in total? how much would the allocator return to atom delegators?
far as i can tell, 2.0 incorporates a parasitic layer of leverage in LSDs and parades the growing number of supporting chains required to attempt correcting the incongruent dependencies that emerge as ecosystem growth. dependence on other sovereign chains increases complexity and risk of exploit and bleeds value from Atom to sovereign chains.
if the only reason ICS chains use ICS is because they are heavily subsidized by Atom delegators, it is not a sustainable venture.
you could fix a majority of governance related objections to 2.0 if you make it so no validators can vote with delegator votes.
seems like validators have to much power over the direction of chains. this creates perverse incentives and provokes political melodrama.
validators get rewarded for signing txns, not mess around with governance and propose a restructuring of ATOMs monetary policy to increase txn volume at the cost of efficiency, security, and token holders.
Its only a rough estimate here, but depending on the native chain the treasury can either be a module in the main blockchain, or a “sidechain” type of deployment using shared security. In the hub’s case I think it’s safe to say we’ll go for a sidechain to keep the hub as minimalist as possible. On that case the cost of running that chain is the same as any chain it’s the cost of running the validation process which is arguably negligeable considering the hub’s marketcap. I don’t have the real numbers here but a validator instance on a cloud can cost between 500-2500$ multiplied by the nb of validators. However, on the return side the value is easy to understand. We seriously increase the governance decentralization (as explained in this paper) while also reducing the cost burden of delegators. In that system the governance organs are funded by their referring cohort (validators pay for validator councils, etc…). This seriously increases the accountability of the councils; They will have to bring value to their cohort otherwise they’ll be defunded and replaced by more productive alternatives. Imho this system is the best I’ve seen so far to incentivize cost optimization of…
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this is a reductive vision imho. In the paper I insist on the fact that governance has to be an opt-in system. That’s the case for every cohort willing to participate. Validators definitely might want to participate and they’ll have the rights to. Some will be just “tx processors” but some may participate in governance as well. On a lobbying vision eventually to defend their business margins or in a broader sense. Remember that their business depend on the blocks being demanded, if the chain goes less active they’ll make less revenues. SO… they definitely have a word to say in that governance structure.
Where I agree with you is in the fact that today they are forced to do governance because otherwise we wouldn’t have quorums to pass votes. My model offer partial solution to this, but the true change has to come from the increase in participation of all cohorts. That’s something we’ll dig deeper into when I’ll disclose some of the things Govmos will offer for this specific problem 
Could you provide the research paper you are talking about ? I see no calculation but very empirical ones
how many delegator votes are validators casting vs delegators casting themselves?
nothing stops validators from self delegating and participating, using others votes to direct the chain to profit themselves isnt a right validators should be entitled to. an opt-in system only centralizes the chain around aggregate voting power of individual validators.
there is likely a workable paradigm for validator controlled votes that would satisfy quorum and reduce the conflict of interest involved in validators controlling the direction of the chains with other people’s votes.
I have seen validator voting power = the square root of delegations +self-delegation suggested. that seems agreeable to me, but if a quorum isnt possible with that adjustment, perhaps there is a better calculation.
The cosmos should work toward efficiency, utility, immutability…not validator profitability at the expense of those qualities.
Thanks for this initial research @Govmos!
I have only one question at this moment in time. When it comes to ‘Delegator Councils’, you mention that these are created for those delegators that don’t have time to participate in governance and decision making essentially and that they should give their vote to a council which they sort of ‘align’ with.
Currently, people delegate (or should delegate) to Validators that they align with or that they like. Validator governance participation has been a hot topic recently and I’ve seen a lot of validators up their game when it comes to this.
So my question is, what is the difference between them and why is there a need to create another layer for this specific council?
It’s a very good point that you have here. I personally think that having delegators council will be the most difficult balance to strike. Still I think in the longer run they have to be there to compensate the overall extended political role the validators will have to endure otherwise; Some validators do play that political role quite well today. But the truth is that as the ecosystem scales I think it’s going to become increasingly harder for validators to do both delegator’s councils & validators council roles. It’s also important to note that inevitably delegators & validators interests will differ at some point. so if there’s no one defending pure delegators interest in the future that might be a problem imho. But I do get your point, delegator’s council don’t seem like an immediate necessity. And tbh I agree with you on that. But the key point of my thesis is to see Delegators as pure economic entities, put their capital at risk and look for growth. That’s what they should defend in gouvernance; take their tokens at risks to allocate the capital the best possible way to bring growth. Validators instead should defend uptime, technical viability of updates & sustainable…
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This sounds a lot more like a patch than a solution to the real problem; In my paper I tried to avoid that and identify simple solution that don’t require too much hassle. Separating powers by identifying which major forces should compete. I came down to that simple solution of 4 cohorts : delegators, validators, app developpers & team+foundation.
We we’ll have these 4 forces participating in governance, there will be less chances to see one cohort controlling the system.
Hello, I’m a simple investor in this ecosystem, and actually a law student.
Governance is a subject that I love pretty much in general. Maybe I have wrong but what you trying to do with the separation between Delegators councils and validator councils seems like what we can see in the congress in the USA with the house of representative and the senate is that true? It smells like you try to build a new state and I am for this initiative.
Like I said I am just a simple investor, I love what we are trying to build in cosmos, but I can’t spend all my time to understand how to grow this ecosystem and it is not my job, I am completely for creating different councils in competition who try to do the best for the interest of the majority that’s how we can see growth coming into the cosmos in my opinion.
( Sorry for the mistakes of language or understanding, this is my first participation thank you for reading me ^^ )
It’s not exactly copying the senate vs house separation. But the key takeway would be that governing blockchain correctly mean that every participant should have it’s own set of representatives in the democratic debate. If we stick to the US legislative structure then our councils would be like the cocus in the house. Because they all defend their own interest (validators defend the tech feasibility & their fee model, delegators defend the economic viability, foundation defend the long-term coherence, apps defend the direction they want in term of development & features). Not having them represented in the debate would mean that one party can set the direction on its own. Which is exactly what the intial “governing council” proposal offered. One council to decide how we should structure governance… that’s the CCP. If we want to make it a democracy then what they proposed in atom2 would be the foundation council, and there would be 3 others cohorts to create (each one with multiple candidates). On top of that the foundation council should be funded by the foundation, not the whole community’s reserve. The paper explains that perfectly. The funding model ensure accountability
I think I know what liquid staking can do. It surely doesn’t allow to transport votes atm but there’s a lot brewing in that direction at quicksilver for exemple. Liquid staking modules will come early next year on the sdk and therefore there are still a lot of things to be added. Splitting financial delegation (destined to validators collateral purpose for security) and voting delegation (destined to cast vote on behalf of the user if he doesn’t) can easily be achieved within the LSM. That was actually one the main takeaways on that paper. We need liquid staking to do that otherwise we’re stuck with the same old problem (the one I’m trying to solve), validators have a double role and this will likely not be suitable at larget scales. Validators will have hundreds of chains to maintain technically… Asking them to run the politics on all those chains is just not serious. We need governance specific bodies, not just for decentralization, but because validators simply won’t be able to do the whole thing forever. A few may still want to do governance, they may create validator councils. Anyway I have to say this kind of comment is quite irritative, would be better to be a bit more…
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it’s a research on an economically viable structure for DAO governance… It was meant to explore a way to use the proposed tech from ATOM 2,0 paper (treasury modules & governing councils) but in a more extended way than having one treasury and one council. We offered depth and balance of forces. I’d love to run calculations but tbh I don’t understand how they would fit in here. Maybe you could tell me which calculation you would like to see and I’ll run them.
Govmos: That was actually one the main takeaways on that paper. We need liquid staking to do that otherwise we’re stuck with the same old problem (the one I’m trying to solve), validators have a double role and this will likely not be suitable at larget scales. So we agree validator governance is a problem… I think the problem is that validators have to much power & dictate the direction of the chain by voting with other people’s votes for their own benefit and at the expense of delegators/investors. and the best/most simple way to deal with it is reduce validator voting power. Govmos: This sounds a lot more like a patch than a solution to the real problem; In my paper I tried to avoid that and identify simple solution that don’t require too much hassle. reducing validator voting power= square root of delegations + self-stake (or similar to account for quorum) solves the majority of governance issues without needing all the complex and messy cohort calculations and such. validators are rewarded for signing transactions, not playing politics. validator incentives, when voting in governance, are not aligned with delegators. validators overweight…
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common_spelling: reducing validator voting power= square root of delegations + self-stake (or similar to account for quorum) solves the majority of governance issues without needing all the complex and messy cohort calculations and such. Your solution is indeed much simpler; We’ve also seen similar initiative like validator’s vote weight cap (in tori i think). These are patches at best, and the problem stays the same. You just shake the soup and install restrictions, but il will be overcomed. Big validators will just run multiple instances if they want to shape governance. Just like imposing caps on airdrops… it’s not solving anything, people just create multiple wallets (solving airdrop is acually also accounted in my solution). On the square root + self delegate, well it will just do the same here… validators who would like to influence governance would just self delegate a lot and takeover large portions of vote power. Actually I also think the problem is more complex than just validators having too much power. It’s a problem of any of the 4 cohorts being part of the network trying to control goernance. Today the risk is around validators, tomorrow that may well…
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how are they patches at best? the problem is that validators have to much voting power that it skews governance toward the benefit of validators at the expense of delegators… Govmos: Your solution is indeed much simpler; We’ve also seen similar initiative like validator’s vote weight cap (in tori i think). These are patches at best, and the problem stays the same. if validators (or anyone else) want to buy a large enough delegation to govern the chain that is fine. Govmos: Big validators will just run multiple instances if they want to shape governance. Just like imposing caps on airdrops… it’s not solving anything, people just create multiple wallets (solving airdrop is acually also accounted in my solution). What good will multiple instances of a validator or wallets do to shape governance that is similarly unfair relative the current validator centric paradigm we currently see? Govmos: On the square root + self delegate, well it will just do the same here… validators who would like to influence governance would just self delegate a lot and takeover large portions of vote power. buying their voting power is preferable to…
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Blockquote actually I have no idea what you mean or where you are going. ATOM 2.0 is a validator’s wet dream. more txns to sign the more money made. the conflicts seem to stem from the validators voting with other peoples votes by default, which means the foundation, or anyone else, needs to onboard validators to get governance passed. validators are holding the cosmos hostage through unfair vote weighting. i’m not that pessimistic but I do get your concern on that one. I think validators are not evil, they just serve their own interest indeed. Just like my models says actually. That’s also the case with a foundation council, that would serve the foundations intersts only. Same fore delegators who would just push to increase the token value one way or the other. And app developpers on the chain would do anything to use the comm pool to fund cool stuff of them all the time… That’s why our thesis is that none of these 4 actors should lead the governance, they must compete against each other to strike the best possible balance. To us, the goal is not to restrict validator’s governance power, it’s to make sure they have opposing powers to do it naturally if they try to abuse.…
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Govmos:That’s why our thesis is that none of these 4 actors should lead the governance, they must compete against each other to strike the best possible balance. To us, the goal is not to restrict validator’s governance power,
Validators start off with to much power. making their voting power flat self-stake would make everyone equal. I am suggesting √delegations + self-stake because validators are more knowledgeable than an average holder, but not so much that it creates a huge disparity like it does now.
why make a foundation council when there is already the ICF?
so long as validators vote with aggregate delegations none of this matters though, whatever councils decide on will still have to ask/convince validators to get permission to pass it. im not sure such a permissioned environment would attract builders let alone investors.
I’m sorry but this answer doesn’t make sense. You are using words whose meaning escapes you. Can you provide the research paper you mention?
Hi
Who are “us” Phil ?
What are your ties with AiB ?
Where in the Atom2.0 paper do you find a “single council” structure ?
Hi Phil - Would it be possible for you to provide a link to the actual research paper? Cheers
Blockquote Validators start off with to much power
I agree on that, partly at least, but our model doesn’t want to crush validator power, just rebalance. We think that this will mostly happend with the LSM (liquid staking module) if we improve it by adding a “Vote Transport” function that moves the vote along with the liquid staked representation. Anyone using LS will stop delegating his vote to the validators it has chosen for security. That breaks the bond between security & governance delegation. People would delegate security to validators, and governance to councils in the treasury module.
Blockquote why make a foundation council when there is already the ICF?
The model we build is applicable to any chain & DAO. That’s why we want it chain agnostic as much as possible. Any chain having a foundation, should formalize the council easily, they would just have to delegate their foundation LS tokens to their foundation council. We use that model to define the basic requirement to call a DAO. It requires 4 councils, otherwise you dont have a DAO, your have relatively centralized operating governance. Here’s our standpoint
it’s pretty straightforward :
- The holder can cast his own vote if he wants to.
- IF the user don’t cast his vote THEN :
- IF the liquid staked token is deposited in the Treasury THEN the council who has that delegated token can cast the vote on the holder’s behalf.
- IF the user has not delegated its token in the Treasury THEN the vote is casted by the validators he has chosen to delegate its security to (the existing model).
Hi, us = me + a dev team behind me which is willing to remain private at that point. We’ll release more details on that later of course. This is just the beginning.
We have no ties with any existing body in the Hub. We are an independant, multi-chain initiative.
In the atom 2 paper, there was a proposition very similar to us with multiple councils freely organizing themselves (quite like we want it to) but there are no balancing between council types like we do (foundation, validators, developer & delegators councils) to ensure decentralization. Moreover what scared us was that hierarchy of power of councils having to elect a cosmos assembly. With little details on that it looked like a super-council capable of veto on councils… We think this is a dangerous vertical solution
Govmos: I agree on that, partly at least, but our model doesn’t want to crush validator power, just rebalance. We think that this will mostly happend with the LSM (liquid staking module) if we improve it by adding a “Vote Transport” function that moves the vote along with the liquid staked representation. Anyone using LS will stop delegating his vote to the validators it has chosen for security. That breaks the bond between security & governance delegation. People would delegate security to validators, and governance to councils in the treasury module. This sounds like a terrible idea. that removes the necessity for those with the most power to have the most skin in the game. what aligns your incentives more to the success of the chain than risk of great loss upon failure? after separating security and gov, what stops the councils from voting to pay themselves the treasury, and minting 40 million more atom? This isnt XRP, 4 councils is not decentralized. Govmos: Any chain having a foundation, should formalize the council easily, they would just have to delegate their foundation LS tokens to their foundation council. We use that model to define the basic…
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I don’t want a centralized political power as you explain .
Actual system is decenlized and democratic enough .
Pretty disappointed in how short the “paper” actually is, if you could even call it a paper. Significant changes should be grounded and justified through proper research, but I don’t see any of that in your document. Not a single reference to any relevant literature to back your claims up. For me, it’s hard to take this seriously when it’s presented like that. Just my 2 cents.
This is indeed the impression it gives. 5 pages that give little or no information. And the author’s answers are curious to say the least. Who are the authors? What are the author’s qualifications?
The page on Commonwealth does not give more clarification and on the contrary reinforces the idea of a not very competent profile of the author
Has anybody asked for your judgement here on a personal level ? This forum has only one goal, share ideas and improve on them by discussing… you are no discussing, you are trolling and offer absolutely no improvement of any form. I’m pretty disappointed to see that happening even here… Who am I ? what the hell you care about ? Am I competent enough to talk ? YES I AM, because everyone in this world is invited to the table… Bring something to the table or leave that post please… we need constructive people here. Your feeling about this proposal can be bad, you’ve shared it already, now either you help improve or you stop monopolizing the topic with unproductive content
It is barely centralized today, and tbh it doesn’t take a PhD in economics to understand the there is a slippery slope. That’s what we highlight on the fig1. One cohort is naturally heading to centralized problems, the foundation type… Turn out the system we have today largely favor them and the validators… ; these two are the most prone to centralization due to the limit number of actors they count. On the other end are the delegators & developers who barely participate in governance today due the complexity it is to do it ; Believe me, I wanted to try myself to see, it IS definitely impossible to participate in governance without spending hours a day to do it. SO >> we definitely need delegates representing delegators interests & developers’. Otherwise the system will naturally centralize even more toward foundation & validator forces.
I hope it’s clearer that way ! Is it ?
While you do have a point in that criticism should always try to be constructive, it is also the case that we have to maintain a certain level of standard when it comes to how we present and formulate ideas and proposals in order to support efficient and fruitful deliberation. Decentralised governance is already complex and time-consuming as it is. Backing up claims not just with well-thought-out justifications and rationales but at the very least some form of research is not exactly an outrageous request but pretty standard practice. For example, you recognise that “some social coordination” is required for blockchain governance to “function properly”, in which not one but many intra-competitive councils is a “must”. Why is that? What kind of social coordination are we talking about, and is there any literature out there that would suggest this approach is the right one in solving that coordination? Is there previous research that can support such claims? I’m deeply engaged in this topic, so I’m genuinly curious of what you have to say. I think a multi-group structure for governance makes a lot of sense for many reasons, none of which are highlighted here. We can’t be making…
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The main research is the one that was putted into the Atom 2,0 whitepaper… the one we made is an abstract at best… written by a single person who might have just a bit of experience in economic models. If I followed your point, participating in debating ideas here requires to spend a year of phd research with full documented sources just to open a topic. Our message seemed clearly written on the intro… atom2 paper has introduced a very good piece of research about treasuries & councils, we just took over on this matter an proposed an alternate system based on the same principles. We came bringing something to the table, most of the response what outrageous critics… It’s astonishingly disastrous to say the least. I don’t have time to make that deep research, does that make it worth nothing ? The path you take here is a very slippery slope. Earlier you called me illegitimate to talk… Well that’s just how censorship begins. I hope things will improve cause I believe in the genuine advancement that the hub has over other forthcoming DAOs. Because we have much more smart people in there than people who just complain and trash other’s work. Anyway… I wish I could have done better in…
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So obviously the project stops when one points out the lack of clarity of the proposal or even its lack of meaning. Everyone can indeed debate, but it is always more interesting to give an opinion when it is constructed and based on an understanding of the subjects discussed rather than on a fragmented understanding. It has been a succession of interventions from the author that have been embarrassing to say the least. I wish him to come back with a more elaborated version, and maybe to have a less imposing ego. I look forward for the Govmos V2 abstract/note/research paper/PhD thesis
I’m going to respond by quoting the author, it will be almost cruel but probably helpful so he can improve. “the one we made is an abstract at best”: The author presented his work as a research paper. Words have meaning and a research paper is expected to have a bibliography, a detail of the problem raised and a thorough explanation of the proposed solution as well as perspectives for further work. The author has at best provided a blog post. “who might have just a bit of experience in economic models” : I don’t deny the author’s competence in various fields, but I note the lack of competence in the field addressed by this post. You can be a great cook without giving value to your opinion on the restoration of chiral symmetry. “Our message seemed clearly written on the intro” : this obviously doesn’t seem to be the case since several different people have expressed a contrary opinion. “I don’t have time to make that deep research, does that make it worth nothing?”. Yes, absolutely. Totally yes. The author talks about a research paper and at the same time confesses that he doesn’t have time to do any research work on the subject. this sentence is terrible but it reflects…
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It has never been presented as a « research paper ». I clearly stated this was research, in a sense this was at the ideation phase, bringing ideas to the table and gather feedback to orientate further. I also mentioned « paper » cause that seemed the appropriate syntax, BUT this was never meant to be a scientific research paper. Now that you mention it maybe we should have opted for ideation instead of research, i’ll update the title to avoid confusion.
You persist on bringing things back to a personal level. This is inapropriate, I did my best to answer some comments of yours that were just absolutely out of sync with what that forum should be. You clearly were the one who started this. Just read your first message plz. This paper was never meant to elaborate as it’s not a proposition, it’s an ideation for a process that won’t be active until a few quarters of Community improvements.
Another very embarrassing answer.
“It has never been presented as a “research paper””: this is literally the third sentence of the document you provided. Please be serious, it’s pathetic.
“i’ll update the title to avoid confusion”: this is a good start but there is still a lot to be done to avoid confusion.
I’m sorry that my first answer was not dithyrambic, it was perfectly calibrated to fit the quality of the proposal made by the authors.
Jesus how long are you going to keep that bullshit going on ? You know what a research paper is, this thing is PDF meant to express research we made on the matter, and it is a “paper”… You can’t be serious with your allegation; Anyway you can keep focussing on 2 words mentioned just once in the paper (and I acknowledge that I should have been more careful on choosing these and never use them both one after the other). OR you can help this ideation move forward instead of wasting both of our time.
NO ONE in here has shared research paper in a scientific form… so what the hell is going with you targeting all your messages in this forum to this particular topic (literally 7/7). I would easily defend that this is smthg personal regarding the words you choose. Idk who you are, but your activity here seems only target to me; Which I suggest you stop now and bring some ideation to the table, otherwise I’ll start ignoring your messages like I would do with regular twitter trolls.
I actually agree that this “paper” lacked of potential sources to back some claims. For my defense, I focussed my time on detailing why with the next pages. The first page was just a rough extract explaining the context of those researches. I thought page 2 would answer that question but maybe this wasn’t clear enough. This is the first paper I ever written. I’m a doer, not a writer. But I had to do this in order to have a seat at the table here. I was expecting people to be gentle. This clearly wasn’t the case. I’m much better at explaining ideations orally but that’s not the accepted form here. If it is, then I’ll be pleased to record a video update on that paper explaining all the thought process involved and the depth there is behind it to scale over time. I did my best and I wasn’t expecting a cheer, but certainly not being taken non-seriously just because I couldn’t spend more time making a whole scientific backed research. Anyway I just went through the timeline of events here and I’d like to apologize, my answers to you have been rude, but your message wasn’t as tainted as Cosmos_Biais. And I’ve been harsh to you mostly because of how he pissed me off with his messages.…
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Your text explicitly mentions that it is a research paper but you indicate that it is not: curious to contradict yourself so many times or to not master simple concepts. But so be it, I will comment on your rag as I go along. “While the early feedback has been quite negative (and understandably so)” : this sounds familiar. “It is not a social instrument, it is a purely economic application that sometimes require some social coordination to function properly” : Can you source this statement ? On the basis of which work do you base this statement? This is the origin of your work and it happens that it is not based on anything tangible. I have never been able to see that this is the accepted definition of a blockchain. “Therefore our standpoint is that we must solve to the governance problem with an economically viable solution”: You haven’t defined the problem you claim to solve. And the introduction of the notion of economically viable solution is not justified and therefore one can legitimately conclude - as I wrote in my first message - that this work invents a problem to bring a crazy answer. “First of all, there can’t be a single Governing Concil”: Why? What is…
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Nope, I decided to ignore you. I think I have got to understand your profile now. I should have just looked at the data provided on your profile here. You’re a troll, and you definitely came here just for me So you can keep spitting around. I won’t read you anymore
I understand that you feel compelled to run away from the conversation that is totally out of your hands.
[Moderator]
This conversation has run its course and is no longer bringing up new ideas or feedback. Let’s leave it here and refrain from any more personal accusations.
Thank you very much for this intervention; It has run out of hands and I wish this kind of unappropriated participation could have been moderated earlier. The overall conversation would have been more constructive
just want to point out the fact that validator cartels have set a scam laden tone with prop89 passing. vividly illustrating the fact that validators cant govern in the interest of the chain. so long as validator quid pro quo enables validators to pay themselves with community spending props, the cosmos will stand a better chance of death than making it into the top 10. I hope others wont let stakefish and cosmic validator forget the damage they have done to the cosmos.