"ATOM ONE" Constitution Proposal

My original understanding of ATOM2.0 after a brief convo was this: that the inflation’s 7% minimum bound would be removed, but that otherwise the 2/3 bonding ratio would be preserved. What I’m seeing here is WILDLY different. Inflation should stay below the dotted line. twitter.com AlphaChadLife @AlphaChadLife On a side note, after seeing the new model for $ATOM 2.0, all I can say is that I can’t wait for @jaekwon ‘s fair @_gnoland . Source: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d… 4:28 AM - 3 Oct 2022 12 2 https://t.co/Zo3oo2DtkV 2/3 of inflation, in the first year 70M ATOMs going to treasury is honestly ludicrous. We barely have an accountable/transparent ICF with a fraction of 2/3 x 70M in its treasury, let alone good DAO tooling for public funds management. The notion that any initial inflation will be offset by new deflationary mechanics is as faulty as a drug addict taking one final hit to “go out with a bang”. It’ll happen again & again. Treasury DAO should have some requirements: it should be funded solely through the 2% tax (or by increasing that tax, or by donation). It should experimentally support…

Excerpt (1198 of 4909 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

通胀和质押是稳定方式，想要发展还需要生态的进化。否则都会走向枯萎！！

Good day/eve Jae.

Allow me to ask some questions in response to your post.

What is your opinion of the inflation dynamics? Isn’t current inflation a pitfall for $ATOM? Do you think it should remain as is, in your perceived as the ideal path forward?

Also, regarding the significant donation from ICF you referred to, do ICF hold sufficient $ATOM (or assets) to the end of facilitating the plan of onboarding consumer chains? if we additionally e.g. raised community pool to 5%+ would that help? And if so, how about the hub’s long term sustainability if ICF breaks the bank by supporting these new consumer chains that will be coming by the dozens?

Also, do I understand well that ATOM ONE Constitution renders the ATOM 2.0 plan void?

Is there any middle path in your mind? To be more specific, would there be any tweaks in the ATOM 2.0 WP that would make it more attractive?

Thanks for your input Jae, always good to read your perspective and looking forward to your response.

It’s difficult to create a constitution when the very basics of governance are not even set. This is a problem all over Cosmos Ecosystem imo. Far to many times the discussions start once the proposal is already in voting period, people flock to twitter or discord to have their say in a very anarchistic way, where one says something and someone else says something different. The main trigger is always that a proposal is not clear, open for different interpretations, … If it’s about money, most of the time it’s not detailed and explained enough who gets what or when for doing what. Basically people have to vote on unclear proposals, just like the promises that politicians make before an election. With foundation or other companies involved, this makes it even more difficult because they make the decisions with next to no input from the community. I think this is something that Jae is trying to sort out for the second time this year with this proposal on the Hub. As for Gno.Land I’ve taken the liberty to start asking people to interact about the basics but it’s hard to get people involved when you’re ‘just’ a community member. My repo on github ( sorry I’m not allowed…

Excerpt (1199 of 1379 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

Hey Jae, I’ll try and break down your observations below. • Why an ICF donation to the on chain DAO is challenging/won’t work? • Demand for the ICF supported set of public goods like Tendermint, the Cosmos SDK and IBC has never been higher. Reducing funding for these projects starves them of engineering resources they need at a critical time. With the TAB, we are organizing and accelerating the technical evolution. We are working on getting more funding from the ecosystem for these public goods through the Cosmos Builders Foundation. • The ICF is a heavily regulated Swiss Stiftung. My understanding is that donating a significant amount of the endowment to the on chain DAO would run into significant regulatory headwinds that make it untenable. Given that the Hub needs working capital now for the imminent launch of interchain security and that returns of that capital need to be controlled by ATOM holders, the white papers issuance plan seems like approximately the only alternative. When legal entities are required, they should be independent of the ICF and legally accountable to ATOM holders and the Council hierarchy. • I want to really focus on the conceptual…

Excerpt (1196 of 3993 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

GM sers

While I’m pro treasury, and pro Atom2.0 my concerns go entirely on the dilution of atom Stakers .

And it’s not about just the money so please don’t come with ICS shitcoin n°345 covering the loss under the hub umbrella.

No

This also means a dilution on governance power.

And a gargantuous proportion of the Atom supply allocated in a treasury ( no matter saying under community power ) is subject to corruption.

Corruption corrupts the corrupted, as long there’s man behind it it can thus therefore will be , and the dilution of community power favours this.

I saved the worst for last

I find it preposterous the fact after 36 months of milking inflation with +50million Atom ( no small deed ) to treasury and once , finally the inflation on atom is settled , all of it continues to go to treasury and nothing to Stakers.
I can’t see anything but a NO WITH A VETO if this is included on the prop.

Not one single atom more should go to treasury, if it dries up, and further funding is needed, then ask the stakers for more, at the time we will have knowledge on how well spent the treasury was.

@Sheville I think your comment is off topic for this thread. Belongs on the Hub White Paper thread.

But I hear you on the tail emission needing to go to stakes.

@jaekwon @zaki_iqlusion @sunnya97 's mesh security is a great idea, and (just IMO) the Hub should run it once it is finished and secure. Currently, work on the module is being done in CosmWasm. There are 3 options for bringing mesh security to the Hub: • Port it to Cosmos-SDK. It seems like this would be more work and lead to possible lags in fixes and updates in one version or the other. • Put CosmWasm on the Hub. This would likely be the easiest course of action. • Run mesh security on a consumer chain. This would likely involve a lot of work to make staking and slashing packets pass through, and could involve extra complication, but maybe it could work. I just don’t want to see a situation where the Hub is not able to iterate as quickly or adopt current technologies because of arbitrary limits on the software framework. Other than mesh security (and I could be wrong), I think almost everything else can and will go on a consumer chain. I also shouldn’t have flippantly dissed Cosmos-SDK in that tweet. That was wrong. I was more complaining about it in the way I (and a lot of other people) complain about Solidity, Javascript, or Go, even though really we love them…

Excerpt (1198 of 1220 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

You can proxy all staking and slashing actions via a consumer chain.

There is no reason why mesh security cannot be a consumer chain.

Thank you for the detailed and measured response Zaki, I will formulate a response here soon within the next 24 or 48 hours. Best case I’m hoping for is for us to come to a mutual compromise by having discussions here, to ultimately have both proposals pass.

I’ll start with partial response. • Governance driven funding will fail, like central planning fails. - where-ever possible we should ensure that intelligence is preserved or amplified in decisions. The way to ensure that good decisions are rewarded and bad decisions punished, is to require individual decision makers to put skin in the game. This is why innovation happens in the private sector, and why governance funding is seen as a corruption of private sector innovation, and why central government planning historically has led to failure. It turns the incentive model of individual merit, into a game of politics. This is true even when decision making is weighted by relative capital. We can see this clearly in the private sector investment world. The best performing funds do not have their decisions made by weighted voting of LPs. Rather, the LPs are free to join and leave, while the investment thesis of each fund is maintained by select GPs. The ATOM2.0 tokenomics model is akin to taxing all investment funds and putting the proceeds into a giant super-fund controlled by LPs. If this were to happen in the real world, the super-fund would create such a large distortion of…

Excerpt (1199 of 5611 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

Hi @jaekwon , first and foremost: thank you for your time engaging in this discussion, your perspective is deeply appreciated. The below post contains some responses to your above post, particularly in regards to DAO driven funding models. Given @zaki_iqlusion ’s comments above, I feel that there is additional room to address these points within the scope of the proposed ATOM 2.0 whitepaper. #1 jaekwon: Governance driven funding will fail, like central planning fails. As I understand it, a key mandate of the ATOM 2.0 whitepaper is to “[…] provide a general specification for DAOs to self-describe their organizational structure and relationships with one another.” As such, given this component, there is no reason to assume that all funding activities that occur on the hub need to follow a centralized planning model. If the primitives for delegating authority and allocating funds are sufficiently powerful, the ratification of loosely connected organizational cells can result in the utilization of a variety of incentive models without sacrificing accountability. For example, it is very reasonable to expect a hybrid model to arise in which funding possibilities…

Excerpt (1198 of 3345 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

Thanks for your post Jae, your points re governance driven funding and the ICF are well taken. I totally agree that the ICF should take lead in funding any ecosystem bootstrapping, and assumed this was not possible because the ICF had run out of funding, but per your note this is not the case. My question continues to be, why hasn’t the ICF published an audited asset report of late? The last update that I could find is from June 2021, with assets totaling just over $500 million. This amount seems like more than enough for bootstrapping DAO experimentation.

I think that the way that inflation was discussed in the whitepaper was very unclear. Thus, I’m in support of a one-time issuance of 69,420,808 atoms into the treasury. I am also in support of a minimal hub, to the degree that I’d like to write it over the next few days. Gaia’s code has become a little unuly for minimalism, with a good example of that being the defunct exchange code that must linger because LP’d tokens have been sent all over IBC. Atom 2.0 isn’t minimal. Here are the risks as I understand them: • technical complexity is increased • there is a chance that the mev related stuff sells out the hub to mevoors. There are safeguards to this but it’s worth mentioning. • the issuance thing is and always will be a gamble Jae I had the same reaction that you did to the wp. (specifically the changes to inflation – it is a vast wp and I need to get my head around your specific ls concerns still) I felt that the section on new issuance wasn’t clear at all. Also, after speaking with some of the paper’s authors, I think it is well intentioned. Your concerns about the hub competing with other cosmos chains are super legit. I think that we should try and get…

Excerpt (1194 of 1238 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

Hello everyone! I’m glad to see this forum and see everyone’s discussion on COSMOS. I am a member of the Chinese community, please forgive my poor English, I use google translate, although I still don’t know how to express my inner thoughts, but I still want to say a few words. Background: The cosmos project was released early, and compared to the current L2 project, it lacks funding. However, through a long period of practice, it has been proved that the advantages of the cosmos network have been reflected. I personally think that cosmos is also L2. ATOM is similar to ETH EVMOS+OSMOSIS+Gravity bridge+NFT+…Similar to OP (=zk=Arbitrum=…) As you can see, cosmos is more like modular, so he is flexible. In the future, if zk is also introduced into cosmos (for example: zkEVMOS), if there is a problem with a certain project, it will not affect others, or the impact will be very small. However, for so many years, Atom lacks the ability to capture value and lacks an anchor in the cosmos ecosystem. It has the same status as ETH. Although ETH is converted to POS, it still cannot expand rapidly, so there is L2. Therefore, the same cosmos 2.0 is proposed, I am very optimistic about it,…

Excerpt (1197 of 2003 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

jacobgadikian:

I think that the way that inflation was discussed in the whitepaper was very unclear.

Thus, I’m in support of a one-time issuance of 69,420,808 atoms into the treasury.

Non sequitur.

zaki_iqlusion:

1. Liquid Staking. The ADR is ready is available here: cosmos-sdk/adr-061-liquid-staking.md at main · cosmos/cosmos-sdk · GitHub

Some specific questions regarding that ADR:

4.1: “A larger exemption factor allows more tokenized shares to be issued for a smaller amount of exempt delegations.” → shouldn’t this say that a larger exception factor allows more tokenized shares to be issued for a LARGER amount of excempt delegations? Why smaller?

4.2: “This design allows the chain to force an amount of self-delegation by validators participating in liquid staking schemes.” → how does it force any amount of self-delegation?

4.3: “It provides a pathway to security under non-exponential issuance policies in the baseline staking module.” → why wouldn’t this work with exponential issuance?

jaekwon: Non sequitur. Indeed I’d like to explain it a little bit, in my opinion the biggest feeling of the atom 2.0 paper is that well after reading it I kind of felt that it obfuscated increases to inflation I think a lot of other people felt that way as well and for a minute I was kind of upset about it and then I realized it had a pretty easy solution, one could literally just mint them all in one batch and then what you get is clarity that section in particular suffered from a lack of clarity. Also the number itself was intended to be a little bit of a non sequitur, here’s how it came about: • my friend worked out this: image 1800×707 127 KB see how in year one 56,253,799 hits the treasury? Simply minting at upgrade height is much easier and it strips the wp of fairly needless math – and – big perk – it becomes clearer. Community members shouldn’t need to put together docs on the numbers and piece them together by guesswork, but that’s the current state of the wp. why 69,420,808? 69 - nice 420 - 808 - - after the musical instrument Here’s the tweet thread: https://twitter.com/gadikian/status/1577112480559804416?s=20 The other saying…

Excerpt (1196 of 4314 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

There are 2 topics about governance. I posted my thoughts on the Community Council on the Charter topic. Full text below: The WP set a long term roadmap for the development of the Hub while the Charter role is to make sure the implementation is done with a certain standard of decentralization, ethics and accountability that protects $ATOM holders. This is why it is crucial for the ATOM community to put sufficient mindshare and thinking into the charter. I’ve taken some time to review work from one of the most brilliant minds in the Cosmos for governance related matters: @sacha . There are some nuggets out there that I can’t recommend enough. Before interacting with this topic, I invite everyone to get familiar with his thinking so here are a few resources to consider: • Concept of Swiss booklets • Swiss Booklet applied to Prop 69 on the Cosmos Hub • Moving beyond coinholder governance: what Cosmos can learn from ZCASH (and vice verça) There is a lot to cover so I’ll only discuss in this post the soon to be established Community Council, which should be the backbone for governance on the Cosmos Hub for the time being and until a full Cosmos Assembly is formed.…

Excerpt (1195 of 3713 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

… continuing from point 5 above … • We want to incentivize 2/3 to be bonded. - responding to the below comments: johnniecosmos: What is your opinion of the inflation dynamics? Isn’t current inflation a pitfall for $ATOM? Do you think it should remain as is, in your perceived as the ideal path forward? jacobgadikian: I’m pretty sure that the driving force behind 2.0 is to attempt to leave inflation behind and I really like that 6.a: Keeping 2/3 of ATOMs bonded is good. 6.a.0: Not everyone should focus on mastering blockchains or crypto-economics. 6.a.1: Staked ATOMs, being more like shares rather than money, separates the users into the cryptoeconomic/PoS aware, and the general population (laymen, or “grandma”). This allows the ATOM distribution to remain more intelligent than the general population. This in turn allows ATOM to represent a differentiated stakeholder class that can best steer its function, BFT-PoS, ICS, and IBC. 6.a.1.A: Without it, it is like letting the Apple computer company make business decisions based on the collective intelligence of its customers, rather than the specialized class of founders, stakeholders, and…

Excerpt (1198 of 7013 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

johnniecosmos: Is there any middle path in your mind? To be more specific, would there be any tweaks in the ATOM 2.0 WP that would make it more attractive? Removal of the notion that any inflation authorized will be counter-balanced by less inflation in the future, which is obviously untrue. The amendment of governance procedures first described in plain English in the form of a constitution (much to be implemented in code later) which requires proposals to be well factored, to prevent pork-barrel clauses (and consequently corruption), and the assurance of conservatism in its evolution by not making too many experiments at once. A well functioning hub should naturally not require bleeding edge innovations on the hub itself. The usage of said constitution to set limits on inflation and treasury, such as by requiring a higher threshold (2/3) to vote in favor of any inflation, and the requirement that those inflated tokens are allocated for a specific purpose and managed by an accountable DAO system; and in the future, by setting limits also on the tax rate. Also see 6.c: Combined with the idea to remove the minimum bound inflation rate of 6% (but keeping the 20%…

Excerpt (1196 of 3087 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

ala.tusz.am: As such, given this component, there is no reason to assume that all funding activities that occur on the hub need to follow a centralized planning model. If the primitives for delegating authority and allocating funds are sufficiently powerful, the ratification of loosely connected organizational cells can result in the utilization of a variety of incentive models without sacrificing accountability. See my point 9 above, which requires no centralized planning at all. We have not seen any model that has proven to incentivize development without sacrificing accountability; we have hardly any DAOs in usage besides bare minimal governance, and even the ICF is still not transparent. So until such a model is proven, it’s all just wishful thinking. Once the cookie jar exists, it will certainly create a proportional incentive for it to be taken by politics and memetic warfare. ala.tusz.am: the token value is probably expected to increase and so the majority of emissions are front-loaded in order to achieve higher $ value funding for projects This is just another way to say that one wants the treasury allocation to be greater than would be…

Excerpt (1195 of 2393 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

zaki_iqlusion: Bias towards forking. We observe that airdropped tokens quickly evolve into their own sovereign community and do not remain ATOM aligned. Ie. If the tokenomic design of ATOM 2.0 is actually superior to ATOM, it will outcompete ATOM and draw mindshare away from ATOM. We’ve already seen this with both OSMO and JUNO. An intended goal of ATOM 2.0 is to not repeat this. ATOM stakers should decide if they want to continue the pattern where the most exciting tokenomics in Cosmos are not in ATOM. By your own logic, a fork of the ATOM distribution to create a new ATOM2 hub will outcompete the hub, and it suffers not from existential threats should the experiment fail. This is the power of mitosis or cell division over self mutation; it allows diversification and minimizes the risk of extinction. To the ATOM holder there would be no downsides. zaki_iqlusion: we think that there is a large amount of capital waiting for ATOM to have a more predictable issuance policy. First the constitution and working councils should prove themselves to be accountable and efficient. Then, we can implement what I described above on how to enable responsible budget…

Excerpt (1197 of 1404 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

Thanks @jaekwon for brought this up. Although building and launching interchain security is what we were waiting for several years, I believe we should carefully investigate what are in the suggested package, not to agree on something we don’t quite well understood or fully discussed well. Seperation of the Proposal • ATOM 2.0 vision and 70M minting is very loosely related each other • There exists no clear plans how to decide and manage this huge newly minted Atoms • Developing ATOM 2.0 itself costs way much less than 70M Atoms (It can be well developed from 2% tax, if we hire the right people.) Staking Reward Inflation ≠ Minting on Treasury • Inflation on staking rewards are not identical with minting on treasury. • Atom stakers are not dilluted by higher staking rewards(because they also receive the inflation), but hugely dilluted by minting on treasury account.(because they cannot financially benefit from new supply) • Result on Atom holders are completely different. • Hence it should be seen as pre-mining new Atoms to treasury account. Careful Migration to DAO • Although I appreciate all the effort from AiB, ICF and related parties to bring Cosmos-SDK…

Excerpt (1199 of 2536 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

Thank you for your thorough responses on both inflation and issuance Jae. Appreciated and thought provoking.

There’s an issue with new users only being able to post once. I’ve created [email protected] where we can use email or web to continue discussions.

Draft of ATOM ONE constitution: https://github.com/tendermint/atom_one ; Call for contributions (by PR and issues); Disclaimer, I only worked on this for 3 hours, this is very rough. It’s a good time to contribute.

The notion that ATOM is a “memecoin” ignores the obvious and original business model for the hub – token transfer fees. Bitcoin and Ethereum gas transaction fees are in the 10s/100s of millions, and we haven’t even gotten to VISA scale yet. ATOM is not money, it’s VISA shares, and FED shares. It’s an alternative to the status quo that Bitcoin originally wanted to be, but more. Well, imagine what kind of social manipulation we must be under, to be pursuing such a dream.

Best part is we’ve done most of the work already. With minimal ICS the simple-transfer-zones are already more or less done. We’re 90% done with massive scale MVP, and after that scaling will be relatively easy. AND this ATOM1 hub is a minimal hub that zones will want to use.

Don’t lose focus!

I’m on your side this time, jae, and hope the light of principle shines into the cosmos

Hey All, Here are my overall thoughts on ATOM 2.0 and where the community should go from here. • The entire WP should not be voted on in its entirety . There are way too many moving parts, and I agree with Jae’s sentiment that DAO governance controls are not mature enough to handle such a large treasury. While other ecosystems outside of Cosmos have launched $500M+ ecosystem development funds, those funds are raised by private capital and this past cycle has shown that they have led to little value to the communities they serve, even with good intentions. • My prior experience has been in Business and Resource Planning dealing with multi-billion dollar and multi-year infrastructure capital plans, and there is definitely some lessons learned from corporate governance and accountability. Corporations go through yearly reviews of future 1yr, 5yr, and 10yr plans and earmark funds for projects with some estimates that have varying degrees of accuracy depending on how far out the project is. This is something, in my opinion, every DAO in the crypto space is lacking. Typically you see a large pot of money sitting in DAO treasuries that are then tapped into based on proposals…

Excerpt (1196 of 3701 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

tusiki: I’m on your side this time, jae, and hope the light of principle shines into the cosmos David_Lightning_Cap: While other ecosystems outside of Cosmos have launched $500M+ ecosystem development funds, those funds are raised by private capital and this past cycle has shown that they have led to little value to the communities they serve, even with good intentions. Great point. David_Lightning_Cap: My prior experience has been in Business and Resource Planning dealing with multi-billion dollar and multi-year infrastructure capital plans, and there is definitely some lessons learned from corporate governance and accountability. Corporations go through yearly reviews of future 1yr, 5yr, and 10yr plans and earmark funds for projects with some estimates that have varying degrees of accuracy depending on how far out the project is. This is something, in my opinion, every DAO in the crypto space is lacking. Typically you see a large pot of money sitting in DAO treasuries that are then tapped into based on proposals reactively coming to the community to vote on with not enough time to truly flesh out. Thank you for your perspective.…

Excerpt (1197 of 9160 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

Hi @jaekwon , listened to your excellent interview on the interop-podcast. Loved your explanations for your concerns about liquid staking. I share this fears, but so far more on an intuitive level, because I’m not that well versed in the topic to frame them as detailed as you did. Really appreciated that. One question regarding the 2-token-model remains for me, though. I believe it got touched upon in the episode, but I didn’t get your counter-argument. In the podcast and here in your last post you use the visa card shares/money analogy. What I don’t understand is, why this should provide more security in case of economical attacks. In case atom succeeds, it becomes the main security set and photon the base money, you already mentioned that photons would outweigh the value of atom potentially. What would prohibit photon-whales to buy a critical mass of atom and dominate the hub in the same way it would be possible in a one-token-model? I get that it would be way easier, if the stake only is 12% or less, but if we guarantee a stake of over 66% wouldn’t it be way better if the worth of atom increased in the same way the worth of the major money increases? This would be the case…

Excerpt (1197 of 3162 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

One question regarding the 2-token-model remains for me, though. I believe it got touched upon in the episode, but I didn’t get your counter-argument. In the podcast and here in your last post you use the visa card shares/money analogy. What I don’t understand is, why this should provide more security in case of economical attacks. In case atom succeeds, it becomes the main security set and photon the base money, you already mentioned that photons would outweigh the value of atom potentially. What would prohibit photon-whales to buy a critical mass of atom and dominate the hub in the same way it would be possible in a one-token-model? I get that it would be way easier, if the stake only is 12% or less, but if we guarantee a stake of over 66% wouldn’t it be way better if the worth of atom increased in the same way the worth of the major money increases? This would be the case in a one-token-model. Shouldn’t we anticipate in the long term that economical attacks will be the main attack-vector anyways, because if crypto goes mainstream, it will be the only method available to every field of expertise and not like the many attacks nowadays only to programmers? Interesting point…

Excerpt (1197 of 2276 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

Hi， I translate the consititution draft to Chinese. Maybe help to let more people know the content. If any misunderstanding, please tell me. Thank you

mirror.xyz/0xshushu.eth

0xshushu:

mirror.xyz/0xshushu.eth

Thank you! I will link to it from github

enflasyon %300 olmuş ve devletin resmi makamları bunu gizliyor %7

Jae: thanks; first for all your work, words in general, and for this first Constitution Proposal. Though it had not passed by now, no doubt it is and will be more and more clear the need of a Constitution/Declaration of Will of the Cosmos Community to state a safe playground for real living people interacting in the virtual. I would like to share two inputs. They are minimal … (not complicated), though necessarily resolute: they require to raise the bar for all actors conduct. I don’t know if they are feasible right now, maybe not (maybe we could find a surprise here)…, maybe now is the proper time, precisely because is still feasible -but personally have no doubt they would push towards the right direction: the true Cosmos vision for a new and healthy internet. If we -individually and as a community- can agree on this two minimal big changes, I strongly feel we’ll make a whole step in the direction of a responsible Hub’s governance coordination, and transparent, enduring DAO experimentation. Rules: • DAOs are created for a specific task, or “mission” ; then DISSOLVED. • No valoper address can vote on Governance. The latter . Validators are a nuclear function of…

Excerpt (1196 of 7436 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

Interesting thought to remove the voting power from validators. It has upsides and downsides.
The first question would for me would be; is there enough participation from individuals to do this? It gives a serious risk of gaming governance, because it would become way easier to sway a proposal in your direction with the right investment.

I asked the same question in the chat for the validator commons ([PROPOSAL][DRAFT] Validator Commons: improving validator governance and leadership - #14 by LeonoorsCryptoman); what is the direction we need to take? What is our dream and end-goal as desired by the community? At this point in time true decentralized governance is something which is certainly not in one of the top spots of being desired imo. Making changes to how we do governance can be an option, but they need to be directed to solve a problem and not create a new one imo

I’d like to reach out to you to learn more about your views on effective governance, can I mail you or find you on Twitter orso? Thanks!