Dudley Flavored POS
This conversation seems to be worth its own thread, and should rightly delve a bit into economics, politics and tech. ICF validator endorsement policy My ideal PoS system IMO has these properties: • The Validators use the network as a user would • All validators directly fund software development • The range of wealth between the biggest and smallest validator is at most 10x (maybe smaller) • Some governance decisions are token weighted, while other are one-validator-one-vote, for minority protection purposes. • There is a relatively small common pool that’s used to fund marketing, development, etc. Most of these validators do on their own. Basically, I’m in agreement on this. Also, I think that the hub is too far gone down its current path in order to be modified to suit this model, and that’s OK because if we’re being realistic, the strategic imperative for the cosmos hub is the deployment of interchain security. ICS is likely to boost the value of the atom and therefore allow it to secure even more projects, and be more and more sustainable as time goes on. This is a virtuous cycle, and so I want to preface all this by saying that this is not really…
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• Validators use the network as a user would I think of Validators as a collection of service providers, I simply mean they should also consume the service they provide. For example, if the top 6 valiators on Osmosis were also the top 3 traders and top 3 liquidity providers. • The range of wealth between the biggest and smallest validator is at most 10x (maybe smaller) This is related to a number of things: • Voting power • Block Production • Block Rewards (but not fees) Basically, we want a PoA system but with scalable punishment for bad behavior and a signal to users regarding bad behavior. (I also believe we should be designing systems such that when validators fail to provide a service, such as failing to meet some timing requirement, the harmed parties should be paid by that given validator from their stake, this is out of scope, but I’m mentioning it for completeness.) I’m trying to describe a system where it’s clear who has what power and why. • Some governance decisions are token weighted, while other are one-validator-one-vote, for minority protection purposes. I’m referring to the legal concept of Minority Shareholder Protection (…
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I think Proof of Engagement (PoE) by the TGrade team is the solution (cc: @ethanfrey ).
Over the time I’m having more appreciation in the design of Proof of Engagement. It’s not that easy any more to be a validator in PoE system, it’s more challenging: takes both responsibility and contribution into the account.
Recommended read: Delegators or no Delegators? Which path does Tgrade follow? | by Martin Worner | TgradeFinance | Medium
Yes, it’s a similar idea.
The interchain foundation pays for this kind of behavior. twitter.com @ Presenting interchain foundation grantee Rick Dudley expressing the icf policy of coordinated abuse of whistleblowers and his point of view that it is a waste of time to fix delegations on the hub. Then, the interchain foundation claims that codes of conduct are there to protect me. github.com/cosmos/gaia Delete CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md `cosmos:main` ← `faddat:patch-35` opened 11:28AM - 07 Jul 22 UTC faddat +0 -133 consumer chains need rigorous protection from all forms of abuse. The second half of this Twitter space concerns this matter. twitter.com @ AMA about @interchain_io delegation policy, retaliation, and codes of conduct. https://t.co/Ai9IpPCvMW Will have an edited version shortly. Rick is an ICF grant recipient. Here’s the report we produced at Notional, our delegators funded this work. https://www.notion.so/ICF-Delegation-Report-b4b8c62295564990800fb1226d585e4b that is all. Everyone have a nice…
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