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ICF validator endorsement policy

Conversation8 posts1,585 views3 likesLast activity Jun 2022
JA
jacobgadikianOP
Jun 2022

Notion The AI workspace that works for you. | Notion A tool that connects everyday work into one space. It gives you and your teams AI tools—search, writing, note-taking—inside an all-in-one, flexible workspace. We’re aiming to solve this with a governance proposal that commits the interchain foundation to a specific set of policies, but the previous proposal really wasn’t fit, and didn’t have enough input. As can be seen in the document above, which is not a complete list of ICF delegates, but is a complete list of ICF delegates that match two conditions: • ICF delegate • sold 100% of commissions for a year key to this proposal is to flip the narrative from delegation with sales of icf delegation permitted, to an endorsement model, so that those with delegations from the interchain foundation are subject to the market, like all validators Context to this is available here: https://forum.cosmos.network/t/icf-harming-gaia-competitiveness/6590/6 But most important, is this: mintscan.io Interchain Explorer by Cosmostation That is what the interchain foundation endorses in a validator. Totally silent, no known code…

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OK
okwme
Jun 2022 1

I think it’s important to have trustworthy information about validators and especially recognition for the public good contributions. I don’t think it’s wise to dictate how any organization operates when there’s no way to enforce that. Once the gov module updates come in the Rho upgrade, the Cosmos Hub Community Pool can make delegations. That kind of delegation can be enforced with the governance module and I think should be the focus if you’re looking for enforceable delegations. The criteria listed is valuable and I know that it would likely overlap with any public transparent delegation policy (which ICF has had near the top of the to do list for a very long time but unfortunately other critical items keep topping it) but I don’t think there is any reason to attempt to force brick and mortar entities to follow something that can’t actually be enforced. I think that collecting public data about validators and making it more accessible is valuable work. I know Thyborg from twitter is working on one such endeavor ( link ). In order to avoid bias i think it’s important that there is never one “canonical” approved validator list either. That would be too easy to corrupt. Jacob,…

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JA
jacobgadikian
Jun 2022

You endorse this? Notion Notion – The all-in-one workspace for your notes, tasks, wikis, and databases. A new tool that blends your everyday work apps into one. It's the all-in-one workspace for you and your team I didn’t describe a canonical list I described a set of policies that Will aid in the creation of one and I don’t want a delegation from the community pool thank you. I think that making that governance proposal would be far too difficult and I don’t want to be involved in the campaign for that. On the flipside I think it’s very easy to see that the ICF has done a very poor job with delegating given that it is the foundation behind the chain and its delegations should signal quality. In my view, they do not. As you can see, my document made absolutely no attempt to create a canonical list. I don’t know why you would describe it that way other than ill intent. The icf needs guidance here. I’m claiming that the icf delegations are of such low quality that they’d harm the use of the hub for consumer chains. Since you’ve decided to mischaracterize this document, which would not in any way take control away from the icf— except…

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JA
jacobgadikian
Jun 2022

I’m not going to make a list! The foundation needs to take responsibility. I can help the foundation to make policy. I am not interested in making a list. The interchain foundation should make the list, based on the policies, and should steadfastly and resolutely stand behind the validators it endorses. Given the state of affairs here…. Why we not slamming People who agree with and defend the foundations policies with code of conduct threats? github.com notional-labs/notional/blob/master/incidents/Letter to the cosmos ecosystem concerning the care and maintenance of the cosmos hub.pdf This file is binary. show original Oh right. Rules are just so that we can remove anybody who disagrees. But no worries, if anybody wants to argue that this should not be a governance proposal and that the interchange foundation but should not make defined commitments to the community, they only need to say that. At no time was I discussing the ridiculous notion of farming the community pool for delegations simply because I can. Hi I also just wanted to post a link here to the single canonical list that we seem to be cool with we are at a serious…

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AF
AFDudley
Jun 2022 1

I think all these models with complex criteria for good and bad validators are silly. We determine who is a good or bad validator by their on-chain activity, that’s the whole point of on-chain stake. If we can’t figure out how to slash them for it, it doesn’t seem fair to anyone, especially the ICF, to place on them the burden of policing the validator set. As I understand it, this policing isn’t part of the ICF’s mandate.

In a similar vein, I think the criteria the ICF uses to distribute funds should be clear and transparent and super easy for anyone to verify.

If we want to vote validators off the network for bad behavior, that should be a one-validator-one-vote super majority decision. All of this extra complexity just makes things worse and no one has been able to explain to me the benefit.

JA
jacobgadikian
Jun 2022

I think that any large delegator has that burden. Particularly with respect to governance. Currently, interchange security has a hard dependency on governance participation. Governance is used to signal whether or not the hubs validators set will validate a consumer chain or not. Furthermore, the hub needs to be an attractive place for consumer chains. Part of that is active curation of the validator set including by the ICF, maybe especially by the ICF. So for example the hub becomes less attractive to consumer chains when the ICF does not re-delegate away from validators that dump 100% and have a 20% commission because the consumer chains need to anticipate that dumpage. So the ICF would want to delegate in ways that make ICS viable. Currently that’s not happening. Also I believe that it is now pretty easy construct the necessary type of/ just so you know, I don’t really think that governance non-participation should result in tombstoning, instead I feel that it should result in the progressive deprivation of earnings. Basically that validator and their delegates should earn less. I do have some kind of bad prototype code on this. Let me make it less bad and make an SDK…

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AF
AFDudley
Jun 2022 1

I think that any large delegator has that burden. The assumption is that large delegators do so to earn rewards without having to run their own infra. My opinion is such large delegators shouldn’t exist in the first place, those entities should be running their own validators and for the most part this is the case. As I currently understand it, the ICF has no plans for running their own validator, so they’re in a unique position that we probably shouldn’t be creating mechanisms for. That said, As I’ve proposed other places, I think The ICF should first publish an easy to audit policy something like an inverse pro-rata. Then eventually, we can put that policy on chain and allow the active validator set to vote on it. My ideal PoS system IMO has these properties: • The Validators use the network as a user would • All validators directly fund software development • The range of wealth between the biggest and smallest validator is at most 10x (maybe smaller) • Some governance decisions are token weighted, while other are one-validator-one-vote, for minority protection purposes. • There is a relatively small common pool that’s used to fund marketing, development, etc. Most…

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JA
jacobgadikian
Jun 2022

I will Sleep, think then post.

First pass?

Don’t dislike at all. Worried about how much code is needed to arrive at this though

Probably okay for icf to run their own validator BUT I think that it could be too large in VotePower terms

Given how stuff works now, not delegating at all would be okay too

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