Proposal: Improve the Nakamoto Coefficient through a 5% Bonus and Progressive Self-Stake 1. Context The Nakamoto coefficient is a key indicator of the Hub’s decentralization. Unfortunately, it has been declining, which increases the risks for consensus security and reduces the network’s resilience against capture by a small number of validators. Today, some validators, notably centralized exchanges and a few large incumbents, concentrate a disproportionate share of the voting power, mechanically reducing the Nakamoto coefficient. The community agrees on the need to rebalance this distribution, while still preserving: • the attractiveness of staking for delegators, • the economic sustainability of validators, • the simplicity of the governance and incentive model. Capture d’écran 2025-09-21 1436542050×1056 283 KB nakamoto-index-2025-11-06 787×388 67.4 KB 2. Problem Statement Without safeguards, large validators will continue to accumulate ever more stake. Delegators, acting rationally, often favor the most visible or best-known validators, or those offering slightly higher yields, without considering decentralization. Strict voting power…

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This proposal will not come on-chain in the near future. I will wait until the delegation program is unveiled for everyone, to see if any adjustments need to be made to this proposal.

Please keep the follow-up to this post on hold until we have more information.

Respectfully,

Position — FOR with caveats I generally support this proposal as it strengthens the decentralization and security of the Cosmos Hub. Strengths: 5% Nakamoto Bonus: provides stable support to small validators and balances rewards. Progressive self-stake (1/250): limits Sybil attacks and aligns validator incentives. Gradual 24-month rollout, balanced for all. Key concerns: Large validators may resist due to slightly reduced rewards. Small validators may struggle to meet the self-stake requirement. The mechanism favors very small validators, who may be technically weaker. Technical implementation is complex and will require thorough testing and audits. Conclusion: I vote FOR, while recommending careful calibration of self-stake, monitoring validator quality, and close oversight during rollout. Suggested improvements: • Dynamic Nakamoto Bonus: adjust bonus based on validator concentration. • Minimum performance requirement: only reliable validators earn the bonus. • Extra grace period for small validators to reach self-stake. • Delegator incentive: slight APR boost for diversifying votes across multiple validators. • Scaled self-stake:…

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We at Stakin support the idea of this proposal, particularly the Nakamoto Bonus mechanism. Introducing a fixed fraction of inflation reward component for all active validators offers a clear and fair incentive for delegators to consider validators outside the Top 10 by voting power. It directly encourages a healthier distribution of stake without introducing complex governance overhead. However, we have concerns regarding the proportional self-stake requirement. Large validators and entities with custodian access to third-party capital(exchanges and custodians) are likely to provide the self-bond ratio with minimal impact, while many small and mid-size operators may struggle to meet the requirement or divert capital away from operations, security, and growth. This could unintentionally reinforce the very centralization this proposal seeks to reduce. We suggest prioritizing the Nakamoto Bonus first, evaluating its effectiveness over time, and only then revisiting capital-based requirements if decentralization does not improve. The proposal could also consider distributing the bonus per operator entity, and not per validator address. This makes splitting a large validator into…

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We need much more feedback of this quality to make the best decisions. Thank you for your insightful input; I’ve taken it into consideration, and indeed, we could split the proposal into two parts. Regarding self-stake, its purpose isn’t solely to prevent duplication of validators; it would primarily lead to greater professionalization of validator operators due to the fear of being slashed. I understand your arguments; however, our plans are likely to be disrupted by the announcement of the ICF delegation program. Furthermore, there seems to be talk of reducing the number of validators by half, and the issue of centralization will arise if the ICF performs poorly. Thank you for your message.

Thank you for this proposal, @Guinch_Roze.

We at LAD are pleased to see that centralization is being addressed with such a thoughtful strategy, which is why we support this proposal. The phased approach to implementation is wise, as it allows us to gauge the validators’ reactions and determine the best way to proceed.

However, we are concerned that some mid-sized validators, who operate on tight margins, may find the proposed self-stake rule (with a slightly reduced reward) too burdensome. If several of these validators choose to exit, it could temporarily diminish the diversity of the validator set, which contradicts the intention of the proposal.

Therefore, when this proposal is revisited after the ICF Delegation Program is in place, we suggest considering adjustments to this aspect. Perhaps a portion of the Nakamoto Bonus pool could be used to help subsidize the stakes of mid-sized validators.

Bonjour à tous

Est-ce que l’on ne pourrait pas juste limiter la puissance de vote quel que soit le nombre de Token mis en staking. Si le problème est sur la capacité de vote qui pose un problème de décentralisation, pourquoi ne pas agir dessus en limitant cette capacité quelque soit le nombre de Token mis en staking ?

C’est une proposition qui devrait voir le jour sous peu par Govmos

[IDEA] Improve the Nakamoto Coefficient Proposal Ideas

Thank you for sharing this idea. We agree that improving the Nakamoto coefficient is an important discussion, but we believe that many in the ecosystem tend to misunderstand the distinction between decentralization in governance and decentralization in execution. Both are critical, but their implications differ — and in our view, one carries slightly more weight than the other. Governance vs. Execution Take the example of a chain with 100 validators, each holding 1% of voting power. In a Cosmos…

Ce sont 2 sujets paralleles et complémentaires selon moi.

UPDATE

Given the community feedbacks over the past few weeks, this proposal will be split into two parts.
The first part, which will be submitted on-chain, focuses on implementing the Nakamoto Bonus, as it appears to have broad support.

The second part, relating to self-staking, will be separated into a follow-up proposal. It likely needs additional work, or may be removed entirely if it doesn’t reach sufficient consensus.

I plan to push the first proposal on-chain soon, requesting its implementation by Hypha, the team responsible for improving and maintaining the Cosmos Hub.

I’m opposed to this proposal. This acts as a quasi-inflation reduction that could have a signficant impact on staker behavior (i.e., ATOM sales akin to what happened the last time inflation was reduced). At best, this will just lead to sybil validators that will simply push out of the set the validators that this proposal is intended to benefit (especially after the set size is reduced in the future). The benefits of this are not significant. At worst, this change could cause ATOM to be delisted on one or more centralized exchanges as it will primarily target centralized exchange stakers. Imo, we should not be making changes to the staking dynamics of the chain without considering the impact on relevant stakeholders. This is something that the upcoming tokenomics research workstream is intended to do. Mechanisms like this one can be considered and discussed by the researchers that will help redesign the tokenomics and staking parameters of ATOM. Doing this as an isolated measure before any of that research is done would interfere with the success potential of that workstream and would be a mistake. My personal opinion, of course, but if this were to go up today i would…

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Ok, I will wait untill the end of tokenomics researchs

I will bring my topic Up. Tokenomic end is approaching, waiting green light to push it on chain

@Guinch_Roze I have been following this draft quietly, but seeing that you intend to bring it back to the table, I must step in from an institutional investment perspective. I fully agree with @RoboMcGobo ’s assessment from a few months ago, and I want to make it clear that large-scale capital will not support this. While the romantic idea of “decentralization” is nice in theory, artificially punishing large validators and CEXs to subsidize smaller ones is terrible economics. Let’s be clear: I am here because the alternative solution— reducing inflation from 20% to 4-5% and compensating with airdrops and other benefits —is far more attractive to me and, most importantly, to CEXs. It represents safe capital and high-level earnings. This is what will keep ATOM firm and stable for years to come. But at what price will we survive if we don’t follow that path? Threatening CEX yields with your proposal introduces an unacceptable risk of delisting . If major exchanges decide that staking ATOM is no longer profitable due to artificial redistribution, the liquidity shock will destroy the price. Furthermore, the moment this is officially published—even before the vote—the “great…

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Maybe this kind of Nakamoto bonus could reduce rewards for CEX validators while benefiting the rest of the validator set.

Cosmos Hub Validator Call July 08 2026: Recap

The report will also show that an overwhelming number of the validator-specific sales come from exactly who you would think: the centralized exchange validators, Coinbase, Binance, Kraken, and Upbit, with huge commissions and heavy stake weight concentration. They are the structural sellers, and we are looking at whether we can offset their specific sales rather than punishing the entire set for something those validators are doing.