Migrate Stride to opt-in PSS
Proposal The Stride team proposes migrating Stride’s ICS configuration from a Top N (95%) Partial Set Security configuration to an opt-in model. Under this change, Stride would be secured by a small, proof-of-authority style validator set, relieving Hub validators of the obligation to run the chain. Stride already has 7 validators lined up for this. Concretely, this is done through a MsgUpdateConsumer proposal that would set an explicit allowlist with the validators included in the set. Additionally, the consumer owner address would be updated from the Hub governance address to a multisig address controlled by the Stride Association. Context Stride was the second adopter of ICS, and the first chain to migrate from sovereign → ICS. At the time, ICS was the Hub’s main product, and Stride supported its development. However, ICS failed to find product-market fit, and Cosmos Labs has told us they plan to deprecate ICS in 2026. The main issue with ICS is that validators must operate chains at a loss, because ICS revenue flows to stakers, not validators. Stride makes ~$400k revenue at current prices, 15% of which (~$60k) is paid to Cosmos Hub stakers. Validators earn their…
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As a person who sees messages like Why am I jailed constantly while my Cosmos validator works okay? from those who either don’t know how top-N chains work or gets into the top-95 VP without running a Stride node and realizing they have to now, this seems like a no-brainer, so 100% YES from me. PSS is way more intuitive here.
What happens with the LSM delegations once these proposals pass?
Are they redelegated and shared between these 7 validators only?
Stride: ~$400k revenue at current prices Just to clarify this is annual revenue? So, so far 15% of this was for all the Cosmos Hub stakers and validators running stride, and 85% for stride? Stride: The 7 validators Stride Association selected are: How were these validators selected? Shoudn’t the Cosmos Hub governance be involved in this selection given that Stride is currently a consumer chain of the Cosmos Hub and not just an unilateral decision by Stride? Stride: Update the consumer redistribution fraction from 85% to 100% So until now, Stride shared 15% of the revenue for all Cosmos Hub validators and stakers, around $60k, which was around $5k-10k to be shared amongst 100+ validators. Do I understand it correctly that the plan now is to share all the $400k with just 7 validators, so around $57k per validator? Why Stride was giving only 15% of the revenue for all Cosmos Hub validators and stakers, and now so generous giving all $400k revenue to just 7 validators? highstakes: What happens with the LSM delegations once these proposals pass? LSM is different from this proposal, this is about the validators running…
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Cosmic_Validator:LSM is different from this proposal, this is about the validators running and securing the Stride chain. For liquid staking a larger and decentralized set is required and approved by Cosmos Hub governance for security and cannot be just a few validators unilateraly chosen by Stride
How so? These LSM delegations are under their direct control and they can do whatever they want with them. I don’t quite see how or why the Hub should have any say in this.
highstakes:How so? These LSM delegations are under their direct control and they can do whatever they want with them. I don’t quite see how or why the Hub should have any say in this.
No, they can’t. The current liquid staking set of validator was chosen and approved jointly by Stride and Cosmos Hub governance, any unilateral changes to that set by Stride would violate what was jointly approved by Stride and Cosmos Hub governance
This has nothing to do with Stride’s delegations. They’ll stay the same.
This is about which Hub validators run the Stride chain as part of partial-set security.
(1)
Annual revenue and yes, so far 15% has been allocated to the Cosmos Hub. This was discussed when Stride onboarded here.
(2)
The 7 validators are teams that Stride chose for their operational excellence, and who have worked closely with Stride in the past. Stride is going through a transition period, and having full trust and an existing working relationship with our partners helps.
The crux of this proposal is to migrate Stride off of PSS topN 95% to an opt-in chain - meaning no validators have to run Stride. That is the main decision Cosmos Hub governance has to make. After that, it’s up to Stride to find and recruit a validator set, it’s not the Cosmos Hub’s right or responsibility.
(3)
No, that’s not how it works. The 15% that was previously spread across the entire validator set will now be directed to the 7 validators.
Cool. Then submit the proposal and let’s get this over with.
Stride:This has nothing to do with Stride’s delegations.
Well maybe it should be, don’t you think??
You forced ~all Hub validators to validate Stride for years for ~0 reward.
Only cherry-picked ~30 validators benefited from all that through LSM delegations. Now you are choosing 90% of those same validators that benefited for years from work all other validators did to benefit from Stride profit sharing ON TOP of keeping LSM delegations to them.
What a joke.
It’d be best to stay on topic and focus on PSS. This proposal isn’t about how Stride does its delegations (which up to Stride governance). It’s about Stride’s PSS configuration.
Addressing your points briefly:
Stride didn’t force Hub validators to do anything. The Cosmos Hub decided to add ICS, onboarding Neutron, Stride, and others. Then, the Cosmos Hub voted to onboard Stride here.
You’re mistaken about how LSM delegations work. LSM delegations aren’t persistent, they rebalance frequently. LSM delegations go to a smaller set of validators because LSM validators must have a higher self-bond to accept the delegations. But the validators lose those delegations soon after they receive them, and they are distributed to the full set. LSM delegations aren’t a revenue source for validators.
But again, it’d be best to stay on topic and focus on PSS and the proposal at hand.
That is just not true.
Check here or any other source and sort by Stride delegations: https://analytics.smartstake.io/cosmos/lsm - the set with large Stride LSM delegations is VERY consistent with minor deviations, I have data points throughout years and I invite everybody to check for themselves. 6 out of 7 of those validators you picked for profit sharing are in this royal 30 set. A lot of validators with plenty of self-bond were never part of these ~30 validators, so that’s not true either.
Stride allows using other validators for LSM but then quickly rebelances to the cherry-picked 30 validators.
So it IS a revenue source through staking rewards for those 30 validators.
But whatever man, it’s your reputation, not mine, I don’t really care anymore.
At this point we’ll just be happy to stop being forced to validate Stride for no benefit and forget about it forever.
Ah I see what you mean - you’re just talking about Stride’s delegations in general, not the LSM delegations specifically.
It’s true that Stride delegates to 32 validators right now. We’re open to revisiting how delegations work - we have different methods across different chains - but it shouldn’t be bundled in with this.
As covered above, the reason for this proposal now is Cosmos Labs reached out to us asking us to migrate Stride to opt-in, because validators are complaining about operating costs.
This proposal is about Stride moving from topN 95% to opt-in (meaning no validator has to run Stride).
This is off-topic but to clarify Stride didn’t ‘cherry pick’ any validators. Several metrics such as uptime, governance participation, and technical and community contributions were considered, then those validators with the highest scores were presented to both Stride and Cosmos Hub governance for voting, and both Stride and Cosmos Hub governance approved and selected those validators. But again this proposal is about PSS so let’s stay on the topic
Well, no offence, but I will believe it when I see it, you were “open to revisiting how delegations works” for years also - after being approached many-many times by multiple validators about it.
You were chosen to be part of the ~30, so it makes sense you defend it - validators were still cherry-picked - based on applications and it was indeed based on some criteria, yes - which makes sense, but applications were never open since (2 years+), so you had to be lucky to get in (on top of being competent) then and that was the only option.
On topic of this proposal - we support making validating Stride optional of course.
How is measurable uptime metrics and governance participation cherry picking? All validators could apply and show their performance there was nothing about luck, and the best performers based on clear data were proposed for Stride and Cosmos Hub governance. But again, this proposal is about PSS, Stride already clarified that this has nothing to do with Stride’s delegations which was the initial concern of why that topic was mentioned
Fully support it! PSS is definitely a better option
I think Stride is being generous with information here in identifying which validators have been selected, but the crux of this proposal is:
- Switch Stride to PSS so that no validators are required to run the chain (this is something many validators have been asking for already, quite frequently and with increasing urgency)
- Transfer Stride’s consumer chain admin address to a Stride-controlled address instead of governance. This is a no-brainer. Of course they should be controlling their own chain.
Anything beyond that is up to Stride, as it is their chain and their issue to negotiate with the validators who agree to keep running it.
Obvious YES from me.
Thank you for bringing this proposal forward. We see the migration of Stride to an opt-in / PSS model as a positive and necessary step. It respects validator autonomy, avoids placing unsustainable obligations on Hub validators.
At the same time, we would like to highlight the importance of conducting a delegation program review. The validator set has changed significantly since the first round of Stride’s delegation program, and the current allocations through the LSM are now outdated. A reassessment would ensure that the validator distribution reflects today’s landscape and aligns with Stride’s decentralization and performance goals.
With this additional step considered as a natural follow-up, we are broadly supportive of the proposal and see it as an opportunity to both strengthen Stride and reinforce its role within the broader Cosmos Hub ecosystem.
Govmos: At the same time, we would like to highlight the importance of conducting a delegation program review . The validator set has changed significantly since the first round of Stride’s delegation program, and the current allocations through the LSM are now outdated. A reassessment would ensure that the validator distribution reflects today’s landscape and aligns with Stride’s decentralization and performance goals. Why off-topic discussions keep being discussed? This proposal is about PSS. The overhead was really high to select the current Stride liquid staking validator set and there were already two rounds of selection done by Stride not only one as you incorrectly suggested, it involved reviewing measurable metrics for all validators that applied and contributions, then multiple governance proposals on both Stride and the Cosmos Hub to select and approve the reviewers as well as to approve the validators with the highest scores. All the validators selected are still in the active set and kept the top uptime, governance participation and other metrics. Validators who were not selected shouldn’t use topics such as PSS here as an opportunity to trying negotiating…
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Govmos:Thank you for bringing this proposal forward. We see the migration of Stride to an opt-in / PSS model as a positive and necessary step. It respects validator autonomy, avoids placing unsustainable obligations on Hub validators.
Thanks for your support. Agreed we should do a delegation review soon.
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This is now onchain
I’ll be voting No on Proposal #1012, not because I’m against Stride evolving, but because of how this is being done.
By directing all Stride-related fees to just seven validators, the proposal effectively reshapes incentives across the entire Cosmos Hub. Even if it’s not intentional, it financially motivates delegators to move their stake toward those same validators to chase higher rewards. That’s not sustainable decentralization, it’s economic consolidation.
We’ve already seen how power tends to snowball around the most visible validators, and this structure accelerates that trend. What’s worse is that control over this configuration moves from on-chain Hub governance to a small multisig, removing the collective oversight that made ICS valuable in the first place.
Stride can absolutely leave ICS if that’s what they need, but it shouldn’t come at the cost of further centralizing power in the hands of a few. This proposal erodes the shared-value model that was supposed to define the Hub and replaces it with a selective payout system. That’s why my vote is No.
By directing all Stride-related fees to just seven validators, the proposal effectively reshapes incentives across the entire Cosmos Hub. Even if it’s not intentional, it financially motivates delegators to move their stake toward those same validators to chase higher rewards. That’s not sustainable decentralization, it’s economic consolidation. This isn’t what’s being proposed. Only 15% of rewards go to the 7 validators. 85% is still used to buyback and burn STRD. Further - how those validators share rewards with their delegators is up to them, if they choose to do so at all. The fees pale in comparison to ATOM staking rewards, and validator commission rates still dominate. Validator brand, commission rates, and ATOM staking rewards shape the Hub - not STRD rewards to these 7 validators. What’s worse is that control over this configuration moves from on-chain Hub governance to a small multisig, removing the collective oversight that made ICS valuable in the first place. … Stride can absolutely leave ICS if that’s what they need, but it shouldn’t come at the cost of further centralizing power in the hands of a few. It’s true that the proposed setup is more…
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Thank you for clarifying some of the numbers, I understand that only 15% of Stride rewards go to the 7 validators and that 85% is burned. But for me, this isn’t about the exact percentages; it’s about the structure and the precedent it sets.
Even a small exclusive reward channel still centralizes influence around a handful of already dominant validators, reinforcing their brand and visibility while further shrinking opportunities for smaller ones. The optics of that matter just as much as the economics.
I also understand ICS is being sunset, but “offboarding” shouldn’t mean replacing collective Hub oversight with a closed multisig. We can design sustainable alternatives without compromising on decentralization.
And on the point about Stride’s delegation program, that’s exactly why this discussion matters. Stride already holds significant influence on the Hub, and decisions like this amplify it. I’m not against progress, but we should make sure we’re not trading long-term fairness for short-term simplicity.
Stride:“copy staking”
Copy Staking is the worst idea, it is destroying decentralization by design.
Why would you increase VP of top validators proportionally to their already massive VP? It makes no sense.
Hey all - some purely logistic stuff here: The new owner address in this first prop (1012) is a Stride address, which will not be recognized by the Hub, so this prop as-is is expected to fail on-chain even if it passes. All of us who reviewed the prop missed this - the new owner address just wasn’t on my radar to double-check and test. And then…the same incorrect file was used to submit a new prop (1013) - human error. The Stride team has submitted a NEW proposal with the correct Cosmos Hub-side new owner address. Hypha has double-checked and reviewed all the addresses: • Consumer ID is correct - Stride’s consumer id is 1 • Old owner address is correct - it’s the gov module • New address is correct - it’s a Cosmos address and Stride confirms they control it • Validator allowlist addresses are correct - they’re the valcon addresses of the 7 validators named in this proposal text • Validator set cap is correct - 7 is the correct number of validators • Top N value is correct - it’s changing to 0 • Validator power cap is correct - it’s set to 1, which will force all validators to have equal weight I would advise validators to vote on all proposals - I think they…
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Stride:This has nothing to do with Stride’s delegations. They’ll stay the same.
@Stride Recently it seems Stride undelegated all ATOM without any previous announcement either here in the forum or X. Is this just temporary to move to the PoA chain and after the delegations will be restored?
Edit: after some research it seems that without any announcement or transparency in the Cosmos hub forum or anywhere apart from the Stride forums the following happened: -In 2023 Stride carried out an extensive selection process over several months with governance proposals on both Stride and the Cosmos hub, this was done to select a very reliable and robust set for the liquid staked ATOM -Because of the key mission of Stride is to support decentralization they had four different selection groups based on the 25% VP quartiles with competition within each group -Drop announced they will wind down in 2025/26 and Stride failed to discuss with them to bring their ATOM to Stride -Quietly in the Stride forum some ‘automated’ set selection proposal was presented, covering not only Stride chains with negligable AUM but also the Cosmos hub, their only chain left with significant AUM. This proposal suggested that the bottom 5% should be ineligible, but it seems the last time they checked mintscan was in 2024, because back then the bottom 5% was maybe the bottom 20 validators or so, but currently the bottom 5% is validators from 77-200, and then from the eligible validators they only…
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I believe there is an opportunity to improve validator decentralization. A Hub-native liquid staking implementation could be designed to distribute stake more broadly and more equitably across the validator set, helping avoid excessive concentration and ensuring that liquid staking contributes positively to the long-term health of the network.
This is not a criticism of Stride or the work its team has done. Rather, it is a reflection on where critical interchain infrastructure should ideally reside. As liquid staking continues to grow, I think there is a strong argument that the Cosmos Hub should either integrate this functionality directly or replicate the core value proposition itself, especially for stATOM.