[PASSED][PROPOSAL] Increase Deposit Amount for Cosmos Hub governance to 500 $ATOM

Author Citadel One Summary This proposal seeks to increase the minimum deposit amount required to submit a governance proposal on the Cosmos Hub from 250 $ATOM to 500 $ATOM to further deter spam. Background For a proposal to enter the voting period, a minimum deposit of $ATOM, configurable by governance, is required. Currently that minimum deposit is set at 250 $ATOM. If a proposal is vetoed by more than 1/3 of the Quorum, all 250 $ATOM is burned. This design is put in place to disincentivize spam. The minimum deposit amount has been last modified 2 years ago by Proposal #87 . Motivation The motivation to increase the Minimum Deposit is simple: To reduce spam. Since the beginning of 2024 there has been 49 spam proposals on the Hub, all of which has been VETO’d. There are also 4 spam proposals during their voting period and 2 spam proposals in the deposit period. For more information, you can visit here . These proposals do not seem to be slowing down which suggests that the cost to the spammers, which amounts to more than 12k $ATOM burned, isn’t enough to deter spam. It’s also worth noting that the 250 ATOM deposit amount suggested by Prop #87 was based on…

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I support that, with the note that once ATOM’s price is back to 10$ or something similar, we should rethink this, as with $10 ATOM the deposit price would be around $5000, which is pretty high and would stop those who do not have these tokens from submitting a proper governance proposals.

I agree with @freak12techno – raising the deposit sounds good when ATOM is low but when the token rises, so will the necessary deposit (including the one to make a param change to bring the deposit down again). So my perspective is: We have unfortunately had pretty consistent spam proposals on-chain since they first showed up. ATOM has fluctuated in value throughout that time – but have the proposals actually reduced when the USD cost of the deposit is high? I don’t think it has, which implies that whoever is funding these spam proposals is willing to burn significant ATOM just to have these things on chain. Integrators have done a good job on the front-end to hide spam proposals and I continue to think that’s the way to deal with spam. As a clarification: JohnMontagu: If a proposal is vetoed by more than 1/3 of the Quorum, all 250 $ATOM is burned. This design is put in place to disincentivize spam. We performed some testnet experiments on burning deposits in February and found that failing to meet quorum should also burn deposits. There’s been some misconceptions and confusion around this because I think it really has gone back and forth based on the…

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lexa: I don’t think validators need to veto things to burn the deposit and punish the depositor. They should just ignore the spam. I actually disagree with this approach. My reasoning is: imagine someone new to the ecosystem going to the explorer and seeing a proposal with like 99.8% veto votes on it, and this would probably lead to them thinking why all these people are voting veto on that and maybe this is something shady about it. On the contrary, having no people voting on a proposal might be indistinguishable from the regular proposals nobody had any chance to vote on yet. Also, some explorers (namely, Mintscan) hide these proposals which have more than a specific percent of veto votes, and validators/stakers not voting on proposals instead of vetoing them might break this UI. (This is probably out of scope of this discussion, yet I think it’s important to note that). On ATOM price fluctuation: one of the cool things that can be done to avoid the deposit price being changed significantly due to ATOM price fluctuation might be using some stablecoin as a deposit denom. That’s exactly what Kujira did. Not sure whether this applies here, as AFAIK we don’t have any…

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Scope of the discussion is what we make it

That’s a really good point honestly. Vetoing spam does serve as a strong social signal.

A stablecoin deposit is a neat idea. I’d like to see more stablecoin action on the Hub in general, especially if we continue funding core teams from community funds.

Agree to both change the deposit to a stablecoin value of what it was when ATOM was at $10 and increase it by 20% then let’s see what happen

I disagree with this proposal. Barely any have made it to voting, raising the bar will do nothing to stop props that don’t make it to voting, and 250 ATOM is still over a thousand dollars. That’s a lot of money to put up already to make a proposal. We need to make it easier to participate, not harder.

Please be sure to review other pending proposals to prevent overlapping coordination efforts: [PROPOSAL #][LAST CALL] raise the Governance `MinDeposit` to 500 ATOMs Parameter Change Change log 2024-02-01 Created initial post 2024-02-16 Moved to “Last Call”. As the poll is currently hesitant between 500 and 1000, we’ll give it another week and move on-chain with the lowest barrier (500) unless the poll shifts significantly enough towards the higher value. Summary This proposal aims to raise the min_deposit parameter of the Governance Module from the existing 250 to 500 ATOMs, effectively doubling it. Details Looking through the recent history of on-chain proposal for the … We raised community feedback on this issue some time ago, and the response was generally positive, aligning with your proposal to increase the minimum deposit to 500 ATOMs. However, we decided to place that proposal on hold to encourage a broader discussion on the governance framework. Despite this, we fully agree with the rationale behind raising the ‘MinDeposit,’ and should you proceed with an on-chain proposal, we would fully support it with a positive vote. Nevertheless, we…

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freak12techno: one of the cool things that can be done to avoid the deposit price being changed significantly due to ATOM price fluctuation That’s a good idea @freak12techno . My only suggestion would be to make it so that the $USDC is not burnt but instead sent to the community pool. This is because, unlike burning $ATOM, the Hub doesn’t benefit from burning $USDC. But until then, I think we should keep adjusting the minimum deposit accordingly. lexa: but have the proposals actually reduced when the USD cost of the deposit is high? I don’t think it has, which implies that whoever is funding these spam proposals is willing to burn significant ATOM just to have these things on chain. Fully agree here. Mostly because these spam proposals are exploiting the LSM to target staked $ATOM. Making the USD price irrelevant, as both the cost and the return of the attackers are denominated in ATOM. Which is why there is a higher chance to reduce the spam by increasing the number of $ATOM required regardless of USD price. My argument about the USD cost refers to what the community deemed an acceptable amount to submit a proposal in USD terms on Prop #87 . And…

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I think it should be 1000 ATOM. Whoever is spamming the chain (most likely Jae because he has the massive ATOM stash) should pay 4x for his spam.

There are literally hundreds that haven’t made it to voting. So yes, factually, most spam proposals haven’t made it to voting. There is already a major financial burden to spam proposals as a thousand dollars goes down the drain when they are veto’d. As Cosmos use and enthusiasm continues to falter, stop making the barrier to participation harder.

Even if hundreds of spam proposals made it to voting, it really means nothing except free funds for the community pool.

I believe it should be tied to the USD price, but 500 ATOM is a good start.

This is a pretty good way of laying out the args. Whats really needed is a way of labelling the spam and rendering its resolution as void.

JohnMontagu:

Prop #87 was based on the price of ATOM at the time, which traded at 10$.

Though spam proposals are a nuisance, current mechanisms seem to be working. As a strong advocate for the minority (Shrimp) party of the broader community, will disagree with this proposal with a firm “No.” It discourages newer Stakers’ from participating through proposals and enabling Whales, or respectfully those with much more capital, to easily continue reigning governance. RE price, we are in an upward trend, deeming this proposal arguably unnecessary.

freak12techno:

ATOM price fluctuation might be using some stablecoin as a deposit denom.

Can agree with this approach, to a degree. Imagine having adopted the dual token signal via “Photon” as the fee token, but I digress.

Problem is I don’t see Shrimps making proposals… considering you need to engage with a long post here on the forum first and gather consensus. For every 1 small guy proposal you probably have 50 regular proposals from the different entities (informal, AADAO…etc) and 50 spam proposals…

Keeping the entry low mostly benefits Spammers

@Tagu you make a valid point!

For those acknowledging there are, in fact, Shrimps (minority), we should vote NWV, which by definition disproportionately (1/50) infringes on minority interests.

As stated in the Hub dot Cosmos dot Network website, NoWithVeto: A ‘NoWithVeto’ vote indicates… (1)… (2) disproportionately infringes on minority interests, or (3) violates or encourages violation of the rules of engagement as currently set out by Cosmos Hub governance.

By acknowledging the existence of “Shrimps,” without straying too far from the original post by Citadel One, you alert the broader community’s need to prioritize omitting “NWV” from Hub governance prior to raising the deposit amount.

allow a longer deposit time, and let multiple addresses deposit into a prop. raise the price to 1k. if a prop is good, the market will push it through. easy peasy

I will never be able to easily afford putting up a prop for 1000$.

Knowing that I might be drifting slightly away from the topic:

I’ve seen well known validators Veto proposal due to personal conflicts/bias against the proposer.

I’ve seen veto’s because they were written ‚poorly‘, and just because of that. Also I’ve seen badly proposals being voted yes by the same validators who would criticize language, simply because it was ‚neede‘ (CW prop).

I’ve seen validators veto proposals because they were bribed to do so.

And I’ve seen validators ignore the ‚rules‘ of the aadao election (920-922).

Reducing is space is nice, but I urge you to discuss about more important governance flaws, that actually are reason why governance is broken - according to MANY people in the eco.

So yea, put it up to 3k$ while you’re at it if you really wanna reduce spam. But don’t act like 1000$ is gonna help having a community that is eager to try to change things. It’s the opposite.

Oh, and I should say, I have more atoms than the self stake of probably the most validators. But since I am not a validator, I can’t just use the money I make for validating while being a shitty actor in the eco like quite a few.

I think a better idea is to just have a mandatory minimum amount for it to even be put on chain in the first place.
Just increasing the overall deposit is not enough, and it becomes a hassle to just be constantly tweaking it.

I don’t think I’ve ever seen a situation where someone couldn’t find help to throw a proposal up.
In addition, most times where that would possibly be an issue, the person is not uploading it themselves anyway. It is usually the case that they are asking a validator or someone to give them a hand to put it on chain. Most of them also have no issue funding it.

To go a little bit out on a ledge here I would say that any wallet created less than 30 days ago has no business putting a proposal on chain anyway.
I know we all love “permissionless” and fight for “freedom” and for everyone to have a voice, but really think about this one. Who is this actually stopping other than spammers or scammers? Maybe people putting up a proposal they think will be very controversial.
Personally I am of the belief that you should put it up with your main wallet or it’s not even worth putting on chain period.

Multiple addresses alrsady can deposit.

StunZeed:

I’ve seen veto’s because they were written ‚poorly‘, and just because of that. Also I’ve seen badly proposals being voted yes by the same validators who would criticize language, simply because it was ‚neede‘ (CW prop).

Aside from echoing your thoughts completely, this direct quote is an unfortunate reality within Cosmos Hub governance.

As a next step solution, what would you say RE prioritizing getting rid of “NWV” prior to tackling this deposit amount issue? It could provide a more balanced approach to the entire community when it comes to fair voting.

Cordtus:

I don’t think I’ve ever seen a situation where someone couldn’t find help to throw a proposal up.

Hoping this is the case, because if so…

FHZ:

As a next step solution, what would you say RE prioritizing getting rid of “NWV” prior to tackling this deposit amount issue? It could provide a more balanced approach to the entire community when it comes to fair voting.

Honestly, I don’t really know if getting rid of NWV is a solution, because I haven’t given it enough thought.

All I know is that there’s PLENTY of validators that disregard the meaning of NWV. I’d love to see validators punished for acting in bad faith on governance, that’s for sure.

…Rather than getting NwV because I don’t know which validator prefers what kind of language or length of a proposal text.

Heck, the AADAO prop even showed us that validators (as well as delegators) don’t even read, let alone open hyperlinks in a proposal text.

So again, talking about raising deposit amounts isn’t gonna solve a relevant problem. Could argue that it distracts even…

Regarding the concerns regarding raising the barrier to the participation of governance, it’s important to consider the following:

• The suggested increase, when denominated in $, doesn’t increase the deposit amount that was approved by governance with Proposal #87
• While it currently requires 250 $ATOM for a proposal to enter voting period, only 25 $ATOM are required to enter the deposit period, during which anyone could contribute to the deposit and push the proposal on-chain. Making the true cost to participate in governance much lower than what people are assuming it to be.
• Afaik I haven’t seen any community members who went through the process of pushing a proposal to the deposit period, fail to get support in the forum from others to push it on-chain.

I do agree, however, with the idea of a dollar-denominated deposit amount for governance participation in the future. Until then, the idea of adjusting the deposit amount to account for $ATOM’s price action since the last update is worth pursuing. Especially when these proposals aren’t showing any signs of slowing down.

Thats great. All that is left is for users to find out about it. Create a normal gov UI and increase voting itme. Then as last step, start doing governance from down (by collecting user feedback and ideas) up (bring it to daos that will create props to go onchain).

We are nearly there. Then follow the price =)

TBH, it doesnt matter. The price can be adjusted at any second. Its more about what comes out of it and how to make it better. Thats the important thing

This proposal must receive a firm “NWV” vote in light of infringing upon minority interest.

If that does not please, nor reflect, this direct part of the broader community, it is strongly encouraged to prioritize creating a proposal to reduce the voting mechanics to a Yes/No, completely omitting the “NWV” feature.

Not only would this signal a key Validator, such as Citadel, prioritizing aid to Hub governance from a bottom up approach, this would significantly help even out the current political gamification amongst validators/delegators alike, creating a more fair and simplified voting field.

Thank you.

On behalf of the PRO Delegators’ validator, we encourage Citadel.One to proceed with their proposal. Additionally, we invite them to participate in the broader governance reform we intend to launch early next year.

This reform will aim to establish a governance framework with a clear set of rules for accessing on-chain governance in a transparent and compliant manner.

While spam-deterring sanctions will be part of these discussions, we believe that access to on-chain votes should be based on more than just “free will.” Some participants have used on-chain governance as a “temperature check” mechanism, and we believe this practice is inappropriate. We will initiate public discussions specifically aimed at determining where the line should be drawn to ensure a more responsible and effective governance process.

Isn’t any signaling proposal a temperature check?

This is outside the scope of this topic, let’s agree to have that debate on the forthcoming community discussion early next year

We acknowledge the importance of improving governance on the Cosmos Hub, and we agree that comprehensive reforms are necessary to address the broader needs of the community. However, in the short term, we support increasing the deposit requirement to 500 ATOM. This increase can help filter out low-effort proposals and encourage more serious, well-thought-out initiatives to reach the voting stage.

While we view this as a temporary solution, we remain committed to discussing long-term reforms to further enhance the governance process.

– GATA HUB

Thanks for the support @Govmos @GATA_HUB.

Just a quick update regarding proceeding on-chain with the proposal:
After talking to the sdk team, it’s best to wait for v21 update. It turns out sdk v0.50 introduced some gov params that were never set to any particular value on the Hub, meaning that a param change prop will probably fail.

Apologies, Citadel. Not to continue straying, but I would hope it is true, despite disagreements, that we are here collectively to support and improve ATOM value accrual and its long term success. With that being said, I’m baffled to see a TOP 20 validator , Provalidator @Govmos , who views: Govmos: on-chain governance as a “temperature check” mechanism to be inappropriate, which is fully agreed upon, chooses to willingly gloss over the clear and established voting mechanics set out by Cosmos Hub Governance. Instead, encourages well-intentioned proposals, such as this, to pass forward on-chain before prioritizing omitting the conveniently, and continuously, ignored “NWV” feature: 1-1 1692×439 82.2 KB One would hope to see esteemed and established validators, such as yourselves, utilizing funds even more effectively, to address the broader needs of the community , by prioritizing correcting the voting mechanics, which seem disregarded anyways, as @StunZeed mentions, before any effort to raise deposit amounts, which indeed is a: GATA_HUB: temporary solution, while, as @serejandmyself correctly states: serejandmyself:…

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JohnMontagu:

It turns out sdk v0.50 introduced some gov params that were never set to any particular value on the Hub, meaning that a param change prop will probably fail.

To add to this, since Hypha found this issue testing the prop on the provider network – the dev team will be adding the default sdk value for proposal cancel ratio (0.5) and leaving proposal cancel dest empty.

These gov params are:

• proposal cancel ratio – The cancel ratio which will not be returned back to the depositors when a proposal is cancelled. (Lexa’s note - we haven’t discussed cancelling proposals on the Hub before, but I believe this is about the proposer having the power to withdraw the prop)
• proposal cancel dest – The address which will receive (proposal_cancel_ratio * deposit) proposal deposits. If empty, the (proposal_cancel_ratio * deposit) proposal deposits will be burned.

Question: Are you against those with substantial capital gatekeeping smaller users from submitting proposals by raising the deposit amount, especially during a bull market?

Answer: Vote against Prop980.

RE the valid concern for discouraging SPAM proposals, there are other ways that do not solely cater, and advance, whale preference.

FHZ:

those with substantial capital gatekeeping smaller users from submitting proposals

This is unfortunately incorrect. It’s worth reminding everyone that submitting a proposal only requires a minimal initial deposit. Once submitted, others can contribute to this deposit until the adjusted minDeposit parameter is met. At that point, the proposal becomes active on the blockchain for community voting. In essence, you simply need to rally enough support to collectively reach the 500 ATOM threshold to make your proposal live. You’re not required to fund the entire amount yourself—collaboration with other stakeholders, whether large or small, is entirely possible. There’s no gatekeeping in this process.

Post-voting update:

With the passing of the proposal, the Min Deposit amount has now increased to 500 $ATOM. As a direct consequence, the Minimum Initial Deposit is now 50 instead of 25 $ATOM.

Note:
Due to an SDK code validation requirement that requires expeditedMinDeposit to be greater than minDeposit, the expeditedMinDeposit has been adjusted to 501 $ATOM to ensure successful parameter implementation.
While a more substantial difference between standard and expedited deposits may be warranted, this consideration fell outside the scope of the current proposal and therefore, if the community wishes to, should be addressed separately.