[PROPOSAL #][LAST CALL] raise the Governance `MinDeposit` to 500 ATOMs
Change log • 2024-02-01 Created initial post • 2024-02-16 Moved to “Last Call”. As the poll is currently hesitant between 500 and 1000, we’ll give it another week and move on-chain with the lowest barrier (500) unless the poll shifts significantly enough towards the higher value. Summary This proposal aims to raise the `min_deposit` parameter of the Governance Module from the existing 250 to 500 ATOMs, effectively doubling it. Details Looking through the recent history of on-chain proposal for the Cosmos Hub chain, we can see that a significant share of the votes are reaching a NO WITH VETO consensus (shown as a light red color in the chart below): image 2212×322 12.2 KB Source: Mintscan Among the latest 50 proposals, we have encountered this situation 16 times (32,00% overall). All these related to spam proposals containing harmful links. Despite the fact that most of the block explorers and wallets have built solutions to filter those risks to the end user, it is legitimate to ask if we shouldn’t take action against this anyway. The aforementioned numbers show that almost a third of recent proposal represent unnecessary pollution (be it harmless spam or…
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I’m strongly opposed to this personally. 2000 ATOM is like $20k. That puts governance proposals firmly out of the reach of most people
We are also opened to lower the barrier if participants think this is too high. We seek a global consensus and will listen to everyone’s feedback to adjust if necessary. 2000 is only our base suggestion, not an imposed decision.
I don’t think it’s a bad idea to increase the min deposit, but 2000 ATOM is waaay too much.
From my personal experience as a validator on the bottom of the active set, when I tried to submit a proposal on chain even with 250 ATOMs, it was a big struggle, and even depositing all of my ATOMs wasn’t enough so I had to ask my friends to help me getting the proposal into the voting period (which eventually happened thanks to them), and increasing it by 8 times would eliminate the possibility for the smaller validators to propose changes to the network completely.
Govmos: We are also opened to lower the barrier When you say “We”, just who exactly are you speaking for? Who are you representing? Also, there are other ways to improve the Proposal process. That can reduce spam proposals without increasing the cost of entry. For Example: A Section for “Arguments Against this Governance Proposal” In the spirit of fostering transparent, informed, and balanced decision-making within our community, I propose that all governance proposals must include a dedicated section titled “Arguments Against this Proposal.” This requirement aims to ensure that every proposal presented for community consideration comprehensively addresses not only the benefits and positive aspects but also the potential drawbacks and opposition viewpoints. The “Arguments Against Proposal” section should be authored by community members who express opposing viewpoints in the hub proposal forum. This group should form a small coalition working collaboratively to draft the “Against” section. This inclusive approach allows for a diverse range of perspectives to be integrated into the proposal-making process. It is a more effective strategy than increasing the…
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This kind of changes should be done gradually so I think 500 Atom as a first step is enough. Then, let’s look again at the data after a few months.
CML: Also, there are other ways to improve the Proposal process. That can reduce spam proposals without increasing the cost of entry. For Example: A Section for “Arguments Against this Governance Proposal” You have raised a very interesting point with the proposition to include “Arguments Against this Governance Proposal” which we should consider to enhance our current proposal framework. We suggest you to submit a separate post in the Governance Meta section of this forum. `[Regarding the "we", I speak in the name of the entire PRO delegators' team.]` Back to the topic, despite the good idea you proposed, this is not going to offer any solution to the current spam problem. None of these people will use your formatting suggestions, they are just using the current low deposit amount to abuse the governance system. The only way to remove that behavior is to increase the pain level we inflict when the rules are broken. They are playing the basic “game theory” strategy here. Shall we note that the last 5 proposals in the Hub are spams. Something needs to be done. Raising the minimum deposit is the logical response to this problem, early feedback has suggested to opt…
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You seem to question the legitimacy of our data and claim this is evidence of our harmful motivation. This is concerning to say the least and we hope that you’ll stop that damaging behavior inside the forum. Moreover, opposing claims that our data is flawed can’t be left unchecked. CML: The actual data is, out of 138 proposals, only 1 proposal (Prop 73) was outright rejected as spam based on “No with Veto”. That amounts to a small amount of only 0.007% (Less than 1%) This quote is indisputably wrong. We provided an historical chart, showing the last 50 proposals broken down by their end voting results. On this sample, everyone can verify the 16 vetoed votes which are all spam proposals. Everyone can dig into the data by looking at the source we provided. CML: Red bars on a bar chart do not automatically signal spam nor does it represent NWV. Most of the red were a majority of “No” votes. This is purely wrong as well… Anyone can verify that by looking at the source provided earlier. The light red color represents the amounts of NWV, as evidence to this screenshot displaying the voting detail: Moreover everyone can follow the link provided…
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What do you mean? Just went on Keplr and among the last 10 proposals, 6 are obvious spams rejected with VETO.
I’m not sure over exaggerating and being dramatic with long posts that don’t say much is useful.
It appears that I was mistaken. My view of the votes were being filtered, preventing me from seeing the vetoed proposals. Therefore, I will issue a public apology for questioning the accuracy of your data when it was my post that was inaccurate. This situation underscores the value of our public forums for discussion. I will remove the incorrect data. But I will still continue to comment on proposals.
Let’s be clear, I was questing your data and presentation as it did not align with what I was viewing. I don’t see the details when I click on your chart. All, I see is just a bar chart.
Now that I see the actual data, I can understand the reasoning for this proposal.
I have deleted the post since the post was mostly a flawed interpretation on my part. I will accept the public shame for my mistake.
If only we need to increase the deposit fee. We shouldn’t increase more than 500 Atom.
Upon analyzing the data, I can now advocate for raising the minimum deposit requirement. The data compellingly shows a need to increase the minimum deposit to mitigate spam proposals. Introducing tougher penalties for spam proposals can be an effective strategy to combat this issue. Perhaps implementing the increases incrementally over time might be a good approach. For example raising deposit fees, maybe starting with a 100 to 150 Atom increase. Then wait and evaluate the data to see if there is a decrease in spam. This incremental approach allows for subsequent data reviews to assess the effectiveness of each increase, aiming to find a balance that discourages spam without hindering genuine participation. If a proposal is marked as spam by receiving a “No with Veto” (NWV) vote, then the deposit should be forfeited entirely to the Community Pool (which I believe is already the case). I agree that the approach can serve both as a deterrent and as a means to improve the quality of proposals. Although this may challenge smaller entities in submitting proposals, it does not exclude them. They can gather support and funding from the community, fostering a cooperative approach to…
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I respectfully disagree with this strategy.
CML:Introducing tougher penalties for spam proposals can be an effective strategy to combat this issue. Perhaps implementing the increases incrementally over time might be a good approach. For example raising deposit fees, maybe starting with a 100 to 150 Atom increase. Then wait and evaluate the data to see if there is a decrease in spam. This incremental approach allows for subsequent data reviews to assess the effectiveness of each increase, aiming to find a balance that discourages spam without hindering genuine participation.
Given Cosmos’s significant market cap of $3.50B USD, the extent of scam proposals is not just alarming, but also unacceptable. @Govmos data has clearly demonstrated the severity of this issue. I prefere a more assertive response: a substantial increase in deposit fees from 250 to 1000 Atoms.
Such a decisive action would serve as a strong deterrent against malicious activities and prepare us for a more secure future. It’s time for a robust cleanup to welcome progress.
Do the votes to veto these scam props usually reach quorum? A quick look says yes. If so, I think raising the minimum is acceptable to raise the stakes for the scammers.
It shouldn’t be an outrageous amount, but I think doubling it makes sense.
Surely there are even more things that can be done to prevent this gross behavior, though.
Early community feedback seems to confirm that as well. We will wait the minimum 14 days and the closure of this vote before proceeding on-chain with the amount gathering the more votes. At the present time is appears to be 1000 Atoms. We will align with the community’s choice.
Let’s be clear: Spam is a front end issue. Simply getting spam onto a blockchain has no benefit to the spammer. Today, anyone can put spam and malicious links into the memo field of any transaction. What’s the difference with governance proposals? Mintscan and Keplr show them prominently on their sites. This gets the spammer in front of eyeballs. The solution to spam is thus for the frontends to be more selective about what they show. They already took some great steps last year by hiding proposals with a high NWV percentage, but I believe these proposals are still visible briefly before enough NWVs are kicked in. Some of you in this thread seem pretty eager to do data analysis, which is great, so maybe you could study the circumstances under which spam proposals are still visible on popular block explorers and wallets. This will allow us to formulate a strategy for dealing with them. One idea would be to have them hide proposals that have not yet received at least one YES vote from a validator. This might hide spam proposals before they have enough NWV to hide, without impacting legitimate proposals too much. Increasing the deposit is not only undemocratic, it is likely…
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we can do a reversal governance proposal if it did not hit the goal
one must be careful with such an increase in mindeposit. this should not slow down the posting of the proposal online because of this barrier to entry to collect funds
I’d suggest doing it gradually. Like, increasing it by 50 ATOM making it 300, then 350 etc. with multiple proposals, having some time between them to evaluate if it actually helps fighting scam proposals and increasing it even more. Because it’s effectively making it difficult for some reasonable parties to submit their proposals.
If you’re a top-ranked validator, it’s not a problem to get that amount of tokens, but if you are somewhere at the bottom of the active set, or if you are not a validator but just a community member that wants to voice their opinion and propose changes or whatever but doesn’t have enough tokens, it’ll become way more difficult with the increase of the deposit. So I suggest being extra careful here instead of going all in, what do you all think?
jtremback: The solution to spam is thus for the frontends to be more selective about what they show. They already took some great steps last year by hiding proposals with a high NWV percentage, but I believe these proposals are still visible briefly before enough NWVs are kicked in. We really like that idea, along with your proposal to suggest hiding proposals until they receive at least one YES vote from any validator. This would shift the visibility problem to a reputation front, as any validator voting in favor of a spam proposal would clearly discredit its governance capability. Despite finding your solution very elegant, there is one caveat—it relies on private parties (explorers) to use the proposed filtering process. We still believe this problem should be addressed on both fronts, by raising the minDeposit and improving explorer filtering. Moreover, we also tend to think that raising the capital requirement to access on-chain should be sufficiently restrictive to compel proposers to come here and debate first. We could easily imagine that a minimal consensus should be reached here, with participants collectively depositing to reach the minimum threshold.…
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JulienViolet:Given Cosmos’s significant market cap of $3.50B USD,
I concur that preventing spam proposals from reaching the blockchain is more crucial than the potential impact on community participation. I am open to a significant increase in the minimum deposit requirement, provided there is broad community support. While I am unsure of the exact amount the minimum deposit should be, I acknowledge that an increase is warranted.
My preference is for a reduction in the number of proposals, focusing on enhancing their quality rather than dealing with the volume of spam proposals currently observed.
I intend to cast my vote in alignment with the majority’s preference, believing in the collective wisdom of the community on this topic.
Thank you for providing the reasons that lead you to change your mind. It is genuinely hard to admit that we can be wrong sometimes. The fact that you did it is testimony to your faithful commitment to improve the chain. This episode is yet another example proving that data accuracy must be absolutely preserved in the forums.
Regarding data, we have to mention that we have a relatively similar argument in ICS rewards debate in this forum. You showed violent opposition to this, similarly questioning our motivations. Our intention is simply to collect data in anticipation to a forthcoming debate, avoiding problems encountered in other proposals where flawed data was also displayed. As proven once again in this post, wrong data leads to wrong decisions.
Despite that hiccup, we also want to encourage you to go further with the idea of mandating an “Arguments Against this Proposal” section in every proposal. This is a really good idea 
I do think that it should be expensive to put a proposal on the Hub, or at least “harder” in different ways because it is a bad look for governance to appear full of scams/useless proposals for new users.
If a proposal is important enough to bring up to governance then if the proposer does not have enough funds to do so, can request a sponsorship from other validators or users to help reach the deposit. That also shows that there is at least some consensus on the proposal and it is not a rogue proposal brought up from nowhere, which will lead to more fruitful discussions in the forum. One cannot just send their idea (even if brilliant) over to voting to Congress, there is some channels they need to pass through first.
Yea, we could filter the main endpoints that list proposals on the backend. The idea of doing it on the frontend is that the frontend can move more quickly, but if frontend providers aren’t moving quickly then perhaps doing it on the backend is better.
Either way, we need solid information on when exactly these spam proposals are still visible to implement the fix anywhere. Has anyone in this thread been gathering that?
The idea of using frontend filtering is certainly one way to “fix” the problem of potential harm contained in spam proposals’ links. However, we haven’t seen strong arguments opposing the idea that raising the minDeposit is also part of the solution. To us, the problem is not only the phishing scam links but also the concern that raising governance awareness through a public vote should not be an easy task. It should be the final step following a carefully conducted preliminary debate right here on the forum. Of course, this relates to the general vision one can have on governance. One thing we’ve learnt from this debate is that we should be more cautious and raise gradually, instead of “sending a strong message” and increase the level of pain for spams’ creators. If we want to increase further in the future, that should only be considered along a broader debate on the governance framework. We believe that the Hub should consider having a general debate that confronts major different points of view on this complex matter. We have plans to initiate that in the coming weeks and hope to have you and other prominent forum participants share their views as well. Your contributions…
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We have now updated the initial post and moved it to [LAST CALL]. At the moment we prefer to opt for the most conservative approach of 500. We will leave that final stage for another week and see if there is a significant shift in the poll which would require to update to another level.
I don’t understand the proposal process
The price of atom is floating and may be higher or lower in the future.
Will the proposed deposit amount need to be changed again as the price changes?
For example, 250atom currently costs about US$2,500 (250atom X10.3 price)
If the atom price rises to $30
USD value is $7500 (250atomX30 price)
People always use dollars to measure whether it’s too much or how much
Whether it can be defined by a [fixed] deposit amount
How many atoms are needed is decided in June every year
If the current price of atom does not exceed 2 times, there is no need to change it.
For example, define the deposit amount and set it to 5,000 US dollars.
Assume that the price of atom in June 2024 is 10
The average price of atoms in June in 2025 is 18, no more than 2 times, no change required, still 500 atoms
(5000/10=500)
In 2025, the average price of atoms in June is 4.9. If it exceeds the multiple, [change] 5000/4.9=1020 atoms is required.
In 2025, the average price of atom in June is 30. If it exceeds the multiple, [change] is required.
5000/30 =166 atoms
Please forgive me if there is an error in translation.
Shi_yi:People always use dollars to measure whether it’s too much or how much
I desagree with your take for the governance process.
in any case, it will remain easy to find 500 atoms to start the chain vote of a well-discussed position.
it may be appropriate to measure over a year the number of proposals in the chain before and after this modification depending on the evolution of the price, and if it is proven that this negatively impacts the governance process, then we can always change this parameter in the future
Shi_yi:I don’t understand the proposal process
The price of atom is floating and may be higher or lower in the future.
Will the proposed deposit amount need to be changed again as the price changes?
As explained in the original post, the rationale behind this proposal is to tackle the indisputable problem that is spam proposals taking an overwhelming share of the on-chain proposals. Moreover it seems like the pace has been raising more recently. The target for this proposal is not to use a $ base value to set the desired minDeposit. This dollar denomination can only make sense if we try to compare with other Cosmos projects.
Anyway regarding this proposal, the goal is to propose an adequate response to try and reduce the amount of spams. According to the community’s input, we will move gradually and assess the situation step by step. We also plan a more global governance debate in the near future which will talk about the minDeposit again, but this is a topic for another day!
Shi_yi:define the deposit amount and set it to 5,000 US dollars.
I think this is a very good idea. Define the MinDeposit based on a dollar denominated stable coin. That way if the price of Atom fluctuates then the MinDeposit is stable. I am not opposed to increasing the MinDeposit, but we need to make sure we have consistency,
Like Shi-yi has pointed out 500 Atom @ $10 = $5,000, but 500 Atom @ $40 = $20,000.
If the price of Atom were to appreciate during the next Bull Cycle, we could find ourselves needing to adjust the MinDeposit back down because nobody will be able to pay the deposit.
But if we baseline the MinDeposit against a stable coin like USDC we avoid this scenario. But the MinDeposit must be paid in Atom.
I doubt we should take the fiat denominated route. But if community ever wants that instead, in terms of efficiency the best we can think of could be to define a “$ bracket” which requires intervention to readjust the on-chain parameter if broken out of. We could also double that with an annual anniversary readjustment back to the mean value of the bracket.
I love this proposal. I think the limit should be 1000 ATOM which is roughly $10,000. As Cosmos Hub grows the bar should be raised and be harder to make proposals. Size by definition comes at the expense of flexibility. Bigger things affect more people and as such should be changed more slowly. As ATOM price goes up the 1000 limit will become $20,000, $30,000 etc which I think is the right progression. I am making differentiation between proposal that could be voted on chain and discussions here on the forums. I think people should discuss everything on the forums. There is no cost to doing that. When it comes to making actionable changes on the chain, this is now a much more serious matter as the discussion is getting materialized with some form of modification of the chain. As the chain becomes more economically important these changes need to be more substantive and changes should be avoided just for change’s sake. The changes need to have a material impact whose value proposition to all people using the chain is well understood. As the bar for putting proposal increases, this will require the proposers to seek more people to sign onto their proposal to raise the required…
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vixcontango:être plus difficile à faire des propositions
the community has aligned itself with the fact that the strong point of the cosmos hub is its governance, it should not be made complicated in my opinion. A healthy hub cosmos is a hub cosmos with regular on-chain propositions
Nope… imo it shouldn’t be easy and cheap to put proposals on-chain.
I’m agree with Govmos and others, in most cases we need to debate and reaching a minimum level of consensus before putting on-chain. As you said, ATOM is a governance token so we need barriers in place to prevent both spams proposals and low-quality proposals.
Atom’s governance needs to be professionalized. Not anybody should be able to post on-chain proposals with a few bucks everytime he feels like it.
Have a good day
I am not complicating anything. We are all talking about simply changing an on-chain parameter. There is no additional formal process being discussed (at least not by me).
The more I think about this proposal, the more I like it. Its core purpose to reduce spam and protect both the governance process and the chain’s integrity is very persuasive. I am neutral about the exact amount at which the MinDeposit should be set. As I’ve previously stated, my intention is to align my votes with the majority in this proposal. My position on this proposal is evolving as I continue to read the on going discussions on this topic.
I’d like to raise a hypothetical question in this discussion: Is there a maximum threshold for the MinDeposit fee that could result in negative or unintended outcomes, possibly undermining the governance process? Moreover, during the last bull cycle, when Atom’s price surged past $40, did we observe any significant changes in the submission of proposals, such as a reduction in their number, a decrease in spam proposals, or an improvement in proposal quality?
My preference leans towards having fewer proposals submitted, with a focus on ensuring those that do make it to the chain are of significantly higher quality.
CML: My preference leans towards having fewer proposals submitted, with a focus on ensuring those that do make it to the chain are of significantly higher quality. We share the same feeling. It seems like a more profound debate on the governance framework is required. Defining clear guidelines to access the on-chain audience. We started this Govmos initiative to reform governance for almost a year now, because we saw this as the most undervalued asset ATOM had in its toolkit. It’s safe to say that our expectations have been unmet for too long and that the overall quality of governance has barely moved through that period. It hasn’t degraded, but it clearly hasn’t improved either and that can’t be an acceptable outcome. Despite little visible improvement to the governance system, there seems to be an increasing amount of people willing to reform it. We think the time has come to initiate a broader debate to define guidelines for basic on-chain governance requirements. This feels like an absolute requirement beyond doubling the minDeposit to study the real-world effect it may or may not have on spams. Once voted through, we will promptly initiate a community debate in…
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Good idea, I agree. Governance needs to be fixed.
Hello everyone , Dear @Govmos Phil , thank for this call. Allow Me a Tiered Approach for a Higher Minimum Deposit Amount Required for Submitting Proposals Within Cosmos Hub Governance Higher min. deposit: To curb trivial suggestions, propose setting an approximate threshold of 500 ATOMs – not burdensome but sufficient to dissuade casual attempts.Implement a tiered system featuring escalating minimum deposits for actionable initiatives: Higher minimum deposit : Demand ~500 ATOMs when filing proposals, balancing serious intent versus financial constraints faced by many members. Tiered structure : Categorize projects into levels reflecting magnitude and priority using variable investment criteria: • Tier 1: Small issue resolution or standard management duties call for `X` quantity of tokens. • Tier 2: Enhancing core infrastructure warrants doubling the above figure (roughly `2 * X`) due to heightened risk exposure. • Tier 3: Pioneering breakthroughs command almost twofold increase compared to Tier 2 (nearly `2 * (2 * X)`), emphasizing rigorous scrutiny needed ahead of substantial resource allocation. With this streamlined format, readers quickly grasp how…
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Does No-With-Veto not deter these kinds of proposals? Isn’t that what that vote parameter is for? If the people want to throw away $10,000 putting up spammy proposals like these - I don’t see how it affects the ecosystem negatively.
Seems that one of the most logical ways to raise the participation levels and at the same time to remove ddos attacks on governance is not putting a very high price on submitting a proposal, but rather (doing it, but with a twist) introducing minimum quorum.
I.E. if a prop costs, lets say 1000 atoms, then the deposit has to come from a minimum of 100 accounts. An account can still deposit 1000 atoms to show his will to push the prop forward, yet it would only o through, once the minimum quorum would be reached. This would require people to cooperate a lot more on a proposal and would make it “skin in the game”, rather than “the price is too high”
Of course, it would mean 2 things:
- Separation of proposal types (software upgrades cannot be taken like this)
- The current prop times cannot go along with this
serejandmyself:I.E. if a prop costs, lets say 1000 atoms, then the deposit has to come from a minimum of 100 accounts.
This can easily be manipulated. Not a viable solution imho.
Anyway we will open a broad discussion on the governance framework after this vote.
First we need to get it on-chain, we’re late on the schedule but there’s just so many things to take care of these days!
Please post this prop ASAP, we now have 9/10 SCAM proposals on the chain.
I dont see how this is easier to manipulate then what is today
Dear @Kpital , the tiered deposit structure and quorum requirements address concerns raised by Govmos and serejandmyself. High enough to deter spam, but not so high that it becomes prohibitive for genuine community participation in governance, while allowing lower-cost options to preserve accessibility and representation. The gradual increase in deposit amounts provides a clear, transparent framework. Building on serejandmyself’s idea, the quorum requirement adds nuance - Tier 1 (500 ATOM) needs 10 unique accounts, Tier 2 (1,000 ATOM) requires 25, and Tier 3 (2,000 ATOM) demands 50. This addresses potential manipulation while preserving accessibility for smaller participants to pool resources. Implementation may be gradual. Starting with Tier 1, the community will monitor impact on proposal quality and participation. Based on outcomes, Tiers 2 and 3 can be incrementally increased, allowing the community to assess effectiveness and make adjustments as needed. Transparent evaluation through forums, data analysis, and community proposals for parameter changes will enable vigilant monitoring and refinements. The tiered structure, though crafted to address diverse needs,…
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Agreed to raise the minimum amount to 1000 ATOM
At this stage, we believe further increases to the minDeposit parameter may not be necessary and could even have unintended consequences by limiting the participation of regular community members in decentralized governance. Since Proposal #980 raised the minDeposit to 500 ATOM, we have not observed any new spam proposals. While this could partly be due to the holiday season, we recommend maintaining the current threshold until clear evidence emerges of disproportionate spam activity, as seen prior to the adjustment. Keeping governance accessible should remain a priority. That said, we are open to revisiting the deposit amount within the broader context of governance reform for the Cosmos Hub. We have plans to propose this discussion in Q1 2025, aligning it with potential constitutional framework deliberations. We are currently coordinating with other community members on this initiative, aiming to integrate governance improvements into a comprehensive constitutional proposal. For further insights on this topic, see the ongoing discussion here . We encourage everyone to actively participate in these important debates—whether on governance reform or the broader constitutional…
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