ATOM Wars: a new strategy for liquidity injections

Note: The purpose of this post is to make concrete suggestions for the design of a system that would complement the Cosmos Hub’s role as a shared security provider and ATOM’s role as the Interchain Capital. It is written by Thyborg & Juan Beccuti (Informal) with numerous ideas & feedbacks from Zaki Manian (Iqlusion), EffortCapital (Blockworks), Sam Hart (Timewave), Jehan Tremback (Informal), Ethan Buchman (Informal), Elijah (Neutron) and Riley (Stride). The Cosmos ecosystem stands out for its unique implementation of token-based governance to allocate funding. And among all Cosmos chains, the Hub distinguishes itself through the diversity of opinions, large participant base, and higher caliber of the discourse. Consequently, many have argued that the main value of ATOM lies in its governance capabilities. How do we translate hypothetical governance capabilities into actual value accrual for stakeholders? We start the ATOM Wars . TLDR: ATOM holders are given the ability to lock up their staked tokens for up to one year in exchange for boosted decision power with regards to the allocation of liquidity injections into third-party projects, sparking a bidding competition (the…

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First and foremost, thank you for crafting this topic, we were desperately hoping for innovation on the Hub and you’ve been able to clearly express a new vision for PoL that is interesting to say the least. We must say that we align with many of the ideas presented here, some have significant overlap with our own ideas which we had planed to release later this week ! Assuming that you now have the first mover advantage, we will take the necessary time to fully review every detail of your proposed vision, cross it over with our own and provide a comprehensive review with possible suggestions for improvement. #1 Design Choices: The ATOM Warz clearly mimics Curve’s architecture for its liquidity war. What concerns us in this regard is the fact that history has shown us that despite the undeniable positive effect on CRV token prices, it ended up in a deterring system undermining CRV’s governance to the profit of Convex. For context, readers can find a brief summary of this here . We think this design choice is a double-edged sword, introducing a gamified method that has proven to be incredibly effective at generating a locked-up supply (reducing supply while creating demand…

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Very interesting. My biggest question is how much demand there will be outside of the AEZ, but I can definitely see where this would be valuable for bootstrapping new protocols and bring in Atom demand, especially those within the ICS realm.

Curious if anyone from Osmosis, Kujira, etc. have been approached for their thoughts on this.

What is the intention with the liquidity provided in props 800, 853 and 858?

Is the intention to withdraw the liquidity and provide it via Atom Wars?

I like the proposal but I can’t follow your math in the example diagrams provide. I must be missing something?

In the diagram “Example of a round (finished)” The OSMO bid is 7k Osmo. There’s 525 (80.8%) vATOM votes for OSMO and the “Expected Pay Per Vote” is 2.0

Where did you get 2.0 as the expected pay per vote?

I thought Expected pay per vote would be the bid (7000 Osmo) divided by Osmo support (525) which would be 13.33 Osmo per vote. What am I missing?

Thank you for helping clear this up.

The ATOM Wars proposal for the Cosmos hub is a forward-thinking approach, leveraging ATOM’s governance capabilities to potentially enhance value for stakeholders.
In my opinion, a critical aspect that warrants emphasis is the importance of comprehensive data transparency and analysis regarding all operations within this framework.

Thank you for this realy great topic !

Where is the demand for this? I’m trying very hard to figure out who would pay for temporary ATOM liquidity.

New projects would overpay and not receive usership or distribution (as most of the incentives will get compounded as Gov layers are built on top a la Convex). The usership & distribution point is for everyone.

Mature projects are currently paying for ATOM liquidity, that if paired with their token, may cost less than this temporary ATOM POL. Let’s assume it IS cost effective, LPs who are incentivized don’t programmatically pull their liquidity if incentives are reduced, whereas ATOM POL go poof the moment the DEX loses.

The Curve demand makes sense, projects can pay to bootstrap any kind of liquidity. The core parties are LSDs and stablecoins, neither of which benefit in ATOM Wars. LSDs can & should be provided for free (see all the past POL proposals). Stablecoins minting using ATOM is more useful than incentivizing a stableswap? Doubt it.

This would be my recommendation. But I think that before that, we’ll want to ensure that the community actually supports the ATOM wars vision, so we’ll probably start with a governance vote to start the liquidity bucket

Using stATOM as proposed would sacrifice ATOM’s sovereignty and radically centralize governance of liquidity provisioning.

Thyborg:

What happens if a project doesn’t return its liquidity injection before the next round starts? Note that a similar risk appears in the current governance system. Voters are tasked to evaluate the quality of the reputation of each project seeking funds. Tranches in our design help minimize risk because a malicious project would only be able to secure one tranche.

The locked stATOM could be put up as collateral to be used as insurance. If the tranch value cant be higher than 1/4 the value of assets locked by voters, this would eliminate the risk of liquidity being lost or not returned before the next round starts.

Love to hear it. Learn from Ethereum, the ATOM Wars will make more incentive for ATOM hodler to stake and lock your ATOM.

common_spelling:

Using stATOM as proposed would sacrifice ATOM’s sovereignty and radically centralize governance of liquidity provisioning.

stATOM is a good way to get started simply and IMO it is relatively safe given that it is administered by a consumer chain. We have plans to also take raw LSM TokenizedDelegations but that’s a bit more complicated.

common_spelling:

The locked stATOM could be put up as collateral to be used as insurance. If the tranch value cant be higher than 1/4 the value of assets locked by voters, this would eliminate the risk of liquidity being lost or not returned before the next round starts.

I like this idea. Supplying liquidity can definitely end up with a loss of all principal so it’s good to think about how to mitigate that. I think the community pool should take a little bit more risk on than voters, but they should also have skin in the game.

I don’t know what to make of this. I don’t like long term lockups even though larger voting power for a long term lockup makes sense. Generally speaking in the crypto industry today, long term lockups haven’t worked out particularly well. The industry is too Wild West and stuff changes every month. Don’t like doing this through stATOM. I think a lot of people will object to that if for no other reason than the fees that Stride charges. I just don’t see how a marketplace is relevant at this point. I think the issue at play is whether liquidity is well provisioned and worries that some earlier projects will take all the liquidity from better projects that show up later. There are a couple of ways to break this down: • If you want to manage liquidity provisioning risk, you need to set limits on how many ATOMs you give to a given project. For example, if you have 1 million ATOMs and you thikn you want to allocate this to 10 projects then you allocated max 1 million /10 = 100,000 ATOMS to each project. Each project is evaluated by ATOM stakers and they say yes or no depending on what they think. Using this approach you also guard yourself against heat-of-the-moment decision -…

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I disapprove of V-TOM

The reason is that staking voting should be simple, fair, and consistent for everyone

Otherwise, the difference in the number of votes due to the selection results will be very large.

It will become a governance platform for a few people and turn into a complex investment

jtremback:

stATOM is a good way to get started simply and IMO it is relatively safe given that it is administered by a consumer chain. We have plans to also take raw LSM TokenizedDelegations but that’s a bit more complicated.

it also provides an unfair advantage to older stATOM as they have become more expensive and would require a 10% fee to vote. How long will it take for the fair version using TokenizedDelegations?

when the LSM TokenizedDelegations are able to be used, will users be able to freely recall the tokenized delegation into their custody afterwards? or will they be forced to choose an LSD provider to exit through?

jtremback:

I like this idea. Supplying liquidity can definitely end up with a loss of all principal so it’s good to think about how to mitigate that. I think the community pool should take a little bit more risk on than voters, but they should also have skin in the game.

what will be the CP budget for this? How much risk are the few stATOM holders going to be able to saddle the chain with? will AAdao be able to vote with their stATOM to direct CP liquidity spends on top of their already substantial budget?

Thanks for the question!

The expected payment per vote is expressed in ATOM (we should have been more clear about this), allowing voters to compare and decide which project to support.

Since, for the example, we used the prices 10 USD/ATOM and 1.5 USD/OSMO, then 7’000 OSMO = 10’500 USD (= 7’000*1.5) , or 1’050 ATOMs. This gives a payment per vote of 2 ATOM / vote (= 1050/525)

Thanks for your valuable discussion! vixcontango: worries that some earlier projects will take all the liquidity from better projects that show up later. That’s why we have multiple rounds. The scheme auctions X ATOMs now, and the same X ATOMs will be auctioned again in one month. This gives later entrants the opportunity to compete. vixcontango: you need to set limits on how many ATOMs you give to a given project. For example, if you have 1 million ATOMs and you thikn you want to allocate this to 10 projects then you allocated max 1 million /10 = 100,000 ATOMS to each project. Yes. The design with several tranches and the fact that each project can only win one tranche aims to limit how many ATOMs we give to each project, and to allocate ATOMs between different projects. vixcontango: Each project is evaluated by ATOM stakers and they say yes or no depending on what they think. Regarding this point and your view against auctions. Notice that in the current auction design, the auction is not really a “standard auction” in the sense that the one who bids more wins the auction. Bidders (projects) have to describe their project…

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I have one reminder: All stakeholders should keep in mind that long term lockups favors big bag holders. If you have 1 million ATOMs, you can lock up 300k to get extra voting powers and still have some liquidity to profit if/when appropriate. When you have a smaller stash, you are less likely to put some into long term lockup to have some minimal influence over some project which could bring some price appreciation to the rest of your stash.

And one question: how many projects have been funded by ATOM (from any source, via any decision mechanism) and have brought tangible economic benefits (price appreciation, token utility, active users) to the hub? The teams involved surely have benefitted, but most chains grow by adding users not projects (even if indirectly).

jBQ:

The long-term lockups here differ from the Polkadot auction. In Polkadot, DOT holders who support a project lock them up for the duration of the lease (2 years??). In this case, an ATOM holder has several options for locking up. If ATOM holders see long-term lockups as too risky, they can simply lock their ATOMs for 1 month and still participate in the auction. Those who are risk-takers can lock them up for a longer period and be compensated with larger rewards. Additionally, if you lock up your token, you do not need to support the same project all the time (as in Polkadot). You can vote for another project in the next round if you realize that the one you supported in the previous round is not a good one.

If let say I lock up my stATOM for a year, I can use my voting tokens again every month when each Tranches period ends?

Exactly. Locking your stATOM will give you, e.g., 100 votes. In round 1, you have the right to use these 100 votes to support a project. When round 2 comes, voters need to decide how to allocate tranches again. So, you have the right to use your 100 votes in round 2 again, and so on.

gaia:

I have one reminder: All stakeholders should keep in mind that long term lockups favors big bag holders. If you have 1 million ATOMs, you can lock up 300k to get extra voting powers and still have some liquidity to profit if/when appropriate. When you have a smaller stash, you are less likely to put some into long term lockup to have some minimal influence over some project which could bring some price appreciation to the rest of your stash.

By comparison to Polkadot’s conviction voting, this is indeed what we’re seeing:

Small voters tend to use 0x or 1x conviction the majority of the time (i.e. those with less than 100k DOT), while voters with 100k-1M DOT are more willing to use higher convictions. As for the largest whales (voters with >1M DOT), they never vote with 0x conviction but are also cautious about using high convictions (4x-6x).

We’ve also seen a dramatic increase in the concentration of exercised voting power in the top 1%, despite an overall increase in governance participation.

Worth keeping in mind

Introduction Hello, I am from pryzm.zone, a platform that lets you split your assets into principal and yield tokens . We are interested in the idea of the ATOM wars, a platform for governance and liquidity, but we have a different approach that we think is better. For context, pATOM and yATOM are the tokens that you get when you lock your ATOM tokens on pryzm.zone. pATOM is the principal token , which means it keeps the same value as your original ATOM tokens. yATOM is the yield token , which means it represents the interest that you earn from locking your ATOM tokens. You can use pATOM and yATOM for different purposes, such as trading, staking, governance, or liquidity. You can also convert them back to ATOM tokens at any time. For a simplified version of how Pryzm works, please see our twitter post titled - How to trade your future yield with Pryzm: a simple analogy with trees and fruit Pryzm has a pGOV module that lets you vote on Cosmos Hub proposals, monetize your voting power and could easily facilitate a credibly neutral market place where users can trade their voting power. It is live on mainnet shortly and currently live on our testnet. You can see the detailed…

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We need more Atom utilities and either Lst or Rwa
And decrease inflation

very good ,ATOM will be platform that lets you split your assets into principal and yield tokens .

I think pryzm is a nice project, I follow you from Terra.
You mentioned that those who are not active leave their power to those who have already voted, levereged voting.
Instead of just giving voting power for free, why not sell unused power with a bribe system, Convex style?

That way those who deposit atoms on pryzm, if they vote are worth what they have decided
otherwise they get a passive yield

I generally understand the essence of this design, which is to distribute the income received from third-party projects to long-term pledgers who are willing to lock up for longer!

This is essentially for the benefit of long-term pledgers. The interests of long-term pledgers have increased, but this will not bring more pledgers. After all, you have to lock for a long time!

So why not switch it up and exchange these rewards for ATOM and destroy them?

I don’t know if there is any misunderstanding
Everyone can easily participate in voting. This is called governance.

If you still need to learn some tricks before you can get started, this is called a game.

Will this be EOS second in the long run? There is still much to learn in the future. It can be quite difficult to use, causing users to flee.

The success of a project lies in how many people will use it and whether it burns currency to reduce inflation.

Thyborg: In its first version, the ATOM Wars platform will only accept stATOMs, i.e., ATOMs liquid staked through the Stride liquid staking protocol. stATOM holders will be able to pick a lock period and receive vATOMs in return. In the next interaction of the platform, we will likely use the Liquid Staking Module DelegationShares instead; that would allow any ATOM staker to acquire vATOMs by directly locking their "DelegationShares’’ (obtained via through LSM) into the new governance platform. Thyborg: stATOM Lock | Power | 1 month | 1x | 3 months | 1.5x | 6 months | 2x | 1 year | 4x | ATOM stakers who choose to liquid stake is because they want more liquidity and not be locked in the unbonding period of 21 days, and also to earn additional DeFi yield on top of staking rewards. Why would those wishing to avoid a 21 days lock-up period choose to lock-up their tokens several months or one year? Even if you use the LSM as you mentioned, the LSM is just a regulation for liquid staking providers so you will be working with different liquid staking providers and it is the same issue. You expect a subset of ATOM…

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hey @Thyborg - thanks for this proposal, and for trying to keep pushing the Hub forward, bringing benefit to the Cosmos Community. While I like the concept, I do have some serious concerns and some additional questions: Thyborg: In its first version, the ATOM Wars platform will only accept stATOMs, i.e., ATOMs liquid staked through the Stride liquid staking protocol. stATOM holders will be able to pick a lock period and receive vATOMs in return. In the next interaction of the platform, we will likely use the Liquid Staking Module DelegationShares instead; that would allow any ATOM staker to acquire vATOMs by directly locking their "DelegationShares’’ (obtained via through LSM) into the new governance platform. This seems like you’re prioritising speed to market over the security of users’s funds. Forcing people who want to participate in ATOM wars to take exposure to a single Liquid Staking Provider is a step in the wrong direction. It translates to this: “If you’re not willing to take exposure to stATOM, you’re not allowed to vote anymore in where liquidity gets deployed”. I like the idea of ATOM-wars, but LSM is the way to go on this. If not the LSM, then…

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I like this idea. ATOM War sounds making community exited.

But I cannot agree with the point that acceptable tokein to vote is only stATOM. I’ve been delegating ATOM, not using LSD servises. I hope I’m one of the member of Cosmos Hub community as far as delegating ATOM. But if acceptable token in Atom War is only stATOM, I don’t have any right to vote to spend fund from community.
So, for me, it doesn’t sound making profit to ATOM and ATOM holder, it sounds more like making profit to Stride, recommending to use Stride.

Really appreciate the idea and work done for this proposal. We need this kind of spirit Few questions: • Isn’t Astroport about to lunch their Xastro Wars with similar concept? (once they fully migrate the governance module from Terra to Neutron network) • Maybe I misunderstood “liquidity injection” but is it only related to pooling on DEX ? (create pools, add liquidity to pool, boost pool rewards). • Does this not over advantage Pool users at the expense of native stakers ? For the ones whose stake long term 90% of their bags natively and participate to governance through voting, why should I liquid stake for pools I don’t use? Overall I like the idea but I fell like the Hub should focus on governance on future consumer chain integration rather that pool liquidity injection only and let this kind of events happened on the Dex itself. • Which makes me think, could we not use this concept to create a vote on the ICS/PSS side only ? Vatom to specifically vote on which consumer chain are integrated. It separates the regular on-chain governance with the consumer chain integration. Reading the other post on PSS, several concerns were about where those proposals…

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sorry i stopped reading when you said Curve/Convex model was good, and the risk level acceptable.

i don’t like it.

Thank you for sharing your ideas and design! We find this discussion highly valuable for the community. Sharing alternatives will contribute to refining the ATOM Wars design.

Just a couple of simple questions:

• Is your design just for the Hub? or will it be a governance platform for any chain?
• Your design also sounds like a vote aggregator. Do you think it could be built on top of the ATOM Wars?

We understand your concern. It’s essential to highlight that our design allows for system updates (or even complete removal) through standard governance procedures. This means that if any single entity gains substantial control, the community retains the authority to take corrective actions.

We appreciate your collaboration with the discussion!

Trix:

Where is the demand for this? I’m trying very hard to figure out who would pay for temporary ATOM liquidity.

There is demand for liquidity, as indicated by Prop 853 and Prop 858. We understand that there are uncertainties about the willingness to pay for short-term liquidity (however, recall that the liquidity stays with a particular project until there’s a better offer). The marketplace aims to figure out what price people are willing to pay for this. Based on market feedback, we may decide to extend the duration of the fund allocation.

Many thanks for sharing your points of view!

gaia:

All stakeholders should keep in mind that long term lockups favors big bag holders

There is already concentration of voting power. The proposed scheme aims to increase voting power only among long-term committed participants. Yet, as you rightly pointed out, larger, committed players might have advantages over smaller ones in deciding the number of ATOMs to lock up for extended periods. We think that the rise of vote aggregators (see DAO Wars) might address and balance this disparity.

gaia:

And one question:

At Informal, we have consistently worked for the benefit of the Hub, contributing to initiatives such as Replicated Security, Partial Security, and now ATOM Wars, among others.

Many thanks for sharing your ideas! Cosmic_Validator: ATOM stakers who choose to liquid stake is because they want more liquidity and not be locked in the unbonding period of 21 days, and also to earn additional DeFi yield on top of staking rewards. Why would those wishing to avoid a 21 days lock-up period choose to lock-up their tokens several months or one year? Even if you use the LSM as you mentioned, the LSM is just a regulation for liquid staking providers so you will be working with different liquid staking providers and it is the same issue. You expect a subset of ATOM stakers avoiding a 21 days lock-up period to choose an even longer lock-up period of months or a year? You raised a valid concern. However, it’s essential to acknowledge that not all ATOM holders are comfortable with adopting a liquid staking protocol and engaging with DeFi. For those holders who prefer not to expose themselves to DeFi, the option to utilize their stATOM for the ATOM Wars will be available. Cosmic_Validator: Since I don’t think you want to increase the inflation, if those locking for longer periods will get more rewards, those with the 21 days unbonding period…

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It can be used for any chain that we support. Our initial plans are to launch with the main zones of Cosmos, Osmosis, Injective, and Terra, but we could expand to more if there is demand from users. Listing of assets is permissionless, so anyone can propose any yield-bearing asset.

I think our solution would eliminate the need for anything additional to be built. I also believe that it is a good solution to have this on a closely related but independent chain, to preserve the integrity of the HUB.

jBQ:

At Informal, we have consistently worked for the benefit of the Hub, contributing to initiatives such as Replicated Security, Partial Security, and now ATOM Wars, among others.

and how has that translated into positive impacts onto the chain?

Many thanks for your comments!

Shi_yi:

So why not switch it up and exchange these rewards for ATOM and destroy them?

The design aims to directly benefit ATOM Wars participants (via bids) and indirectly all ATOM holders (via PoL)… We intend to allocate 100% of PoL revenues and 10% of bid-related revenues to the community pool. The utilization of these funds is a topic for ongoing discussion. Some of the funds may be reinvested to sustain and expand the scheme, while alternative options like burning ATOMs may be also under consideration.

Many thanks for sharing your ideas! dneorej-persistence: This seems like you’re prioritising speed to market over the security of users’s funds. Forcing people who want to participate in ATOM wars to take exposure to a single Liquid Staking Provider is a step in the wrong direction. It translates to this: “If you’re not willing to take exposure to stATOM, you’re not allowed to vote anymore in where liquidity gets deployed”. Initially, we are opting for stATOMs to expedite system testing, as integrating LSM shares would require a more extended timeframe. We intend for deployment on Neutron, alongside a restricted liquidity bucket. We believe this approach doesn’t compromise the security of the hub. Overall, we advocate for a faster testing and iteration of ideas and designs within the Hub. dneorej-persistence: In prop 853 there is a clear form of revenue sharing back to the Cosmos Hub, so in a way, this ‘customer’ is already paying. With statements like this, it would be more interesting to see what an expected ROI on these liquidity provisioning arrangements is. What’s a fair price for this service which is acceptable to both provider and…

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Many thanks for you comments! Tagu: Maybe I misunderstood “liquidity injection” but is it only related to pooling on DEX ? (create pools, add liquidity to pool, boost pool rewards). Pooling on Dexs is just one possible use for the liquidity injections. In practice, there are no restrictions on the types of projects that can request funds. For example, lending, borrowing, stableswaps, stablecoin minting, superfluid staking, staking are all potential use cases. Recall that since each project must include a description of how it will use the ATOMs, voters are the ones who decide which projects are worthwhile. Tagu: Does this not over advantage Pool users at the expense of native stakers ? For the ones whose stake long term 90% of their bags natively and participate to governance through voting, why should I liquid stake for pools I don’t use? in fact, the scheme is exclusively designed for ATOM stakers. They will enjoy additional rewards if they decide to participate. Those with tokens in liquidity pools cannot participate in the ATOM Wars. Tagu: Which makes me think, could we not use this concept to create a vote on the ICS/PSS side…

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Thanks for commenting.

We understand your concern. The exclusivity of stATOM is only temporal since it will allow to launch ATOM Wars without much delay. We aim to allow other LSM TokenizeDelegations in the future.

Many thanks for all your thoughts and improvement propositions!! We will discuss them carefully.

Govmos:

What concerns us in this regard is the fact that history has shown us that despite the undeniable positive effect on CRV token prices, it ended up in a deterring system undermining CRV’s governance to the profit of Convex.

We acknowledge the potential risk associated with a single entity gaining significant control over vATOMs. However, in our design, the entire system can be updated or completely removed through standard governance procedures. Thus, we consider the risk to be acceptable and manageable.

Govmos:

We sincerely recommend designing this system with a dedicated LST on day 1 instead of using stATOM and then switching.

We understand your concern. We have chosen stATOMs for faster implementation and system testing, as integrating LSM shares would necessitate a more extended timeframe.

One final question remains regarding the design: could you elucidate the reasons behind discarding the option to use AATs? As far as I know, AAT’s design was precisely tailored for this liquidity allocation purpose.

Additionally, on-chain governance has already endorsed AAT modules’ development via Prop #864. I’m curious why you didn’t opt to collaborate and bring evolution to this Hub infrastructure. In our original design, we intended to leverage AATs instead of deploying a Neutron smart contract. This point stands out as the primary difference between our two designs for PoL systems. I’m interested in hearing more about the considerations that led to this decision.

Thank you,

In general I believe this idea is worth exploring! But I have a couple of thoughts on the implementation: • What mechanism can be put in place to make sure that regular community funds are not used for POL after implementing this? Why this is important: If POL is spent via gov props from the general community pool in parallel to the POL from the POL basket, there may not be enough community funds left to fund core teams such as Informal or initiatives like AADAO. Ideally social consensus alone for not using the general funds for POL is not enough. After talking to Noam, it seems AAT would fix this. • Project vetting While in theory rational votes would not vote for any liquidity proposal that isn’t “worth it” for the Hub, there are two flaws in this logic: 1 : Users do not seem to understand the ins and outs of Impermanent loss & liquidity provision, as shown bei users getting rekt by IL in the quasar TIA vaults last month. 2 : users may vote based on bids rather than based on the risk/return for the Cosmos Hub Possible solution: Have a committee vetting projects and potentially only allow Atom/Atom derivative LPs • Bids Adding to the previous point…

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A lot of questions, but first and foremost. Why only stAtom? I see it is mentioned that it will not be the case in the next upgrades which might come in years to come. but by then we are making other LSPs obsolete. This should not be happening.

I just published a new topic exploring potential risks and limitations in the original iteration propose. It also suggests a few adjustments that could improve the value prop of Atom Wars here.

I’d love to hear the feedbacks of the community on it!

jBQ: We believe this approach doesn’t compromise the security of the hub. I didn’t say it compromised security for the hub… I said “This seems like you’re prioritising speed to market over the security of users’s funds.”. Meaning it compromises security for the end users and the people competing in atom wars, as they are now forced to take exposure to a single LS provider which they can’t choose. That’s not cool. Either you allow users to choose which LS provider they are OK having exposure to, or you don’t use LS providers (and use LSM), or you allow both. Forcing users to take exposure to Stride is not a fair ask. jBQ: Our framework incentivizes competition among projects. The market will decide which is the price that a project has to pay for liquidity injections. Not really if you force said competitors to first of all take exposure in their competitors LSTs… jBQ: The stATOM-based design is a temporary solution Explain to me the added complexity of allowing other LST providers’s tokens? Seems like a simple whitelisting process to me. jBQ: Once launched, this will facilitate the conversion of locked stATOM into locked…

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Thanks for your sharing your ideas! Moonman: Project vetting A design in which ATOM holders’ decision is entirely based on the risk/return for the Cosmos Hub is what we have now. ATOM Wars aim to encourage ATOM holders to participate in funding decisions in exchange for a tribute for supporting a particular project. Projects must compete for such support. However, holders should also evaluate projects based on quality and their impact on the Hub. There’s a long-term incentive tied to this: if supporters choose low-quality projects and funds are lost, future funding for ATOM Wars may decrease, impacting supporters’ future profits. Since the community pool bears the primary cost of lost funds, not individual supporters, @JohnMontagu has suggested additional measures to better align these incentives. Moonman: Bids Bid payments are conditional on winning. Hence, the loser project in your example will not pay anything. Moonman: Short Cycles don’t align with slow Hub governance This is a flexible parameter that can be easily adjusted. We’re eager to hear what the community thinks about it. Thanks for your feedback.…

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Hey @Thyborg,

I know you guys are gathering the feedback and drafting a final version of this prop. I request another round of debate on the final draft rather than posting it directly on-chain.

Yes, that’s the plan

Landslide would pay for ATOM liquidity and security.

Landslide is the IBC connection to Avalanche, and our protocol is looking to more closely align itself with the Hub.

This is very interesting to learn from the demand side of the equation. We would be pleased to hear more details and/or potential suggestions you think could help the final product to better suit your needs (if any).

Landslide seems like an interesting project with great potential for Hub alignment indeed. On a more personal note, we still have to conduct our due diligence and therefore we would like to ask if you would be opened to share 30m of your time with us to discuss your project’s vision and strategy. Feel free to send us a message at [email protected].

Thank you for your time!

The Cosmos Hub is an ever-evolving ecosystem where the community works together to strengthen governance of ATOM. Which will help improve long-term profitability and promote the growth. It show the community’s commitment to the the Cosmos Hub by. Establishing a clear and transparent process for the creation and management of dedicated governances for each ICS agreement. Ensuring that the governance structure is designed to be resilient and adaptable to changing market conditions and regulatory requirements. Leveraging the expertise and framework of the AADAO (Atom Accelerator DAO) to create a sub-DAO specifically designed to manage the governance of ICS agreements. Ensuring that the governance structure is designed to be compliant with regulatory requirements, such as those related to transparency, accountability, and conflict of interest. Exploring other approaches and frameworks, such as creating dedicated governances for each ICS agreement, with a focus on regular review processes and adaptation. This governance structure could help to ensure the resilience and sustainability of shared security models like ICS, while also providing a level of institutional…

Excerpt (1193 of 1530 characters). Read the whole post on the forum ↗

To make this short, I dislike this idea. New tickers like “vAtom” makes it complicated for everyone, Cosmos needs to remain simple.

Also “Atom wars” sounds destructive.
Do we want to start to make “atomic bomb” references? You may find it fun now. A name like that will modify the image of the project however. It will also hinder recovery after peak bull (participants, and developers, will feel more bad after the big blow, it’s a psychological thing).

I don’t believe that the concept of vATOM is overly complex compared to other developments in the blockchain space. However, it will undoubtedly require some educational content to ensure understanding and adoption among users.

Regarding the name of this new concept, ‘ATOM Wars’ is undeniably reminiscent of Curve Wars. If the term “war” raises concerns or is deemed inappropriate, we can certainly explore alternative options. One suggestion is ‘ATOM Forge’, which shifts the focus away from competitive connotations and instead emphasizes the user’s central role in governance processes. By invoking the imagery of a forge, this name implies the act of shaping and molding governance decisions and outcomes, aligning well with the platform’s purpose of empowering users to actively participate in governance.

We can call it ATOM Love

This topic’s idea/implementation is the only thing core / BD team should be busy with if someone really wants to bring users/projects into cosmos.
ATOM should be the biggest source of liquidity within Cosmos. Full stop. Not uscd or usdt. Hear me out - stables are must have but native token will always be valued more hence it should be the backbone just like ETH.
Please whoever is actually implementing this idea/proposal - be bold and do whatever it takes to launch this initiative

It seems to me that this vatom component is simply adding complexity, via creating a gating token, with no real benefits…

That’s pretty much the point of any smart DeFi scheme. Let me help you out:

The only thign DeFi did for the world is this: it evened out the chances between those 12 dudes with ties in the oval office and a housewife/man at playing economical schemes

That’s not a bad thing on its own. It’s amazing. It created what others called equality or what in anarchism is called the free market (anarchism stands here with purpose).

Issue is, it didn’t solve (and it will not) human behavior (i.e. greediness). Hence, and back to the topic: that is the point of vatom or any other similar idea. Create a form of complexity that will, in turn, create rewarded retention for those seeking it, in other words - complexity. It’s just not necessarily a bad thing in this case (not it has to be good, that’s a subjective opinion for each person)

This forum post is linked in a recent tweet from Cosmos Hub (https://twitter.com/cosmoshub/status/1782348888948744571) also linking to this blogpost from AADAO (Atom Accelerator DAO). So, if there is already a grants program, the AADAO, which gives funding also to early stage projects building in the Cosmos ecosystem, community initiatives, etc., how is the ‘Venture Grants’ not just a duplicate of AADAO? How is this Venture Grants program different from AADAO and not a duplicate?

thanks for your comment! Sorry for the late response, we have been working in the new version based on feedback we got from the community.

A litepaper will be released soon.
The idea might seem complex at first glance but it is not very sophisticated. As @Dino suggested, it might be necessary to educate users at the beginning.
In any case, if after releasing the litepaper there are some parts that are not clear enough, let’s us know. We will be happy in clarify them.

Regarding the name. Yeah, we took note about it.

thanks!

A litepaper will be released soon!

Gm! Is there a rough estimate on when we should expect the litepaper to be out? Thanks!