Fixing Public Funding: The Developer Revenue Incentivization Program (DRIP)
The Developer Revenue Incentivization Program (DRIP) Disclaimer: This work is funded by the AADAO. Although this research post is topically related to the recent joint Community Spend proposal by Informal Systems & Hypha, this is by no means an attempt to interfere with that process. If ATOM holders agree that the Developer Revenue Incentive Program is a workable and desired solution, development will likely only be completed somewhere in 2024, well beyond the timeframe for their funding request. This work should not be considered a viable alternative to their proposal. TL;DR - This is a post requesting feedback on how to change the infrastructure behind the way we fund development teams. It proposes a ranged percentage based allocation of inflation + revenue. This percentage is based on the USD value of ATOM and has an upper percentage limit that cannot be exceeded. A revenue share model is also suggested. Author: Noam Cohen (Binary Builders) Introduction Over the course of the years, the Cosmos Hub has developed a “founder absence”. Other chains in the ecosystem, like Osmosis, Neutron, Injective and so many more all enjoy a thriving founding team that remains…
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Thank you Noam - I think this is a great innovative idea and first step to address the issues you mention (assuming a few details are ironed out), allowing the community greater control and means for accountability. Would be very much in favour of this proposal. Though, I am seeing plenty of current proposal suggesting some sort of oversight committee, and I think we ought to consider this carefully. Not sure how well such a system scales. In a hypothetical scenario where we have, lets say between 10 and 15 DRIP/development (similar to Hypha & Informal prop) and consumer chain committees (RMIT prop), how could the community adequately monitor these and the work they’re performing? We should be careful to not replicate traditional bureaucracy. Some additional questions for your consideration: • How would this subDAO committee be formed, and how do you see it carrying out its work? • Regarding the possibility of teams temporarily receiving insufficient funds due to price fluctuations - How do you envision teams navigating volatility risks etc, especially if they occur for extended periods? • Imo I agree with the need for long-term incentive alignment. Beyond the…
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